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ABSTRACT—A major shift is transforming the trade and environment field,
triggered by governments’ rising use of industrial policies to spark nascent
renewable energy industries and to restrict exports of certain minerals in
the face of political economy constraints. While economically distorting,
these policies do produce significant economic and environmental benefits.
At the same time, they often violate World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules, leading to increasingly harsh conflicts between trading partners.
This Article presents a comprehensive analysis of these emerging
conflicts, arguing that they represent a sharp break from past trade and
environment disputes. It examines the causes of the shift and the nature of
the industrial policies at issue. The ascendance of these Next Generation
conflicts transforms both the international and domestic political
economies of trade litigation and environmental policy. It raises
implications for the choice of forum for trade litigation, the divide between
industrialized and developing countries’ strategic interests, the stability of
domestic political alliances, and the availability of WTO legal exceptions
for environmental measures.
Perhaps surprisingly, the most worrisome implication of Next
Generation cases for both environmental protection and trade liberalization
arises from often-overlooked trade remedy laws. The choice of litigation
forum matters greatly because the compliance options differ depending on
the forum. As a result, the environmentally harmful consequences of Next
Generation cases are likely to be greater in domestic trade remedies cases
than in WTO dispute settlement cases. To mitigate the environmental
harms from Next Generation cases and reduce the threat of a green trade
war, this Article suggests that we focus on reforming domestic trade
remedies rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Conflict between international trade and environmental protection is
once again on the rise. After a decade of tranquility, major trading powers
are aggressively challenging each other’s pro-environmental policies in the
name of global trade rules. Indeed, 2012 proved to be the most contentious
year ever, with more conflicts looming on the horizon.
In March 2012, the United States, EU, and Japan joined forces to
challenge China at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over China’s
export restrictions on rare earth minerals, enacted allegedly for
environmental reasons.1 Two weeks later, a WTO panel heard oral
arguments in a case brought by Japan and the EU over Ontario’s feed-in
tariffs for renewable energy.2 In May 2012, the U.S. slapped punitive tariffs
1

Alan Beattie et al., Fight Against China on Rare Earths, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2012, 6:34 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4c3da294-6cc2-11e1-bd0c-00144feab49a.html#axzz2if0z1fA4.
2
Shamsiah Ali-Oettinger, WTO Hearing: Canada Defends Its FITs, PV MAG. (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/wto-hearing--canada-defends-its-fits_100006288/#a
xzz2o28QMlSl.
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on Chinese solar panels up to 250%, denouncing Chinese manufacturers for
unfairly dumping their goods into the American market.3 China, in turn,
attacked U.S. states’ rebates for renewable energy installations.4 By
September 2012, the EU had opened its own investigation into unfair
practices of China’s solar panel manufacturers.5 Weeks later, China
responded by filing its own WTO case against the European feed-in tariffs
for violating WTO rules.6 The year ended with a WTO panel finding
Ontario’s feed-in tariff illegal.7 This list is but a sampling of the growing
conflicts.8 As we shall see, 2013 has proven to be equally contentious, with
several important WTO rulings and confrontations over tariffs imposed on
renewable energy goods.9
Deep tension between the competing goals of global governance
regimes—encouragement of national environmental policies versus
removal of protectionist trade barriers—is not new. The last time trade and
environment conflicts were at a similar state of high alert was the mid1990s, when the United States imposed environmental conditions on
imports of tuna and shrimp, and developing countries successfully
challenged these regulations as illegal under international trade law. The
recent cases, however, represent a dramatic departure from past conflicts.
They are driven by the rapid rise of green industrial policies—the
application of traditional industrial policy instruments to spur the
development of renewable energy and environmentally friendly industries.
Indeed, the policies underlying the recent disputes have more in
common with recent industrial policy measures in the steel, automobile,
and semiconductor sectors than they do with the import measures on tuna
and shrimp in the environmental disputes of the recent past. Despite this
difference, however, these industrial policies have as large, if not larger,
3

Ehren Goossens et al., U.S. Solar Tariffs on Chinese Cells May Boost Prices, BLOOMBERG (May
18, 2012, 3:56 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-17/u-s-solar-tariffs-on-chinese-cellsmay-boost-prices.html.
4
James T. Areddy & Wayne Ma, Beijing Flares Up at U.S. on Solar Tariff, WALL ST. J., May 25,
2012, at B3.
5
Keith Bradsher, Europe to Investigate Chinese Exports of Solar Panels, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
2012, at B3.
6
Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member States—Certain
Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 7, 2012).
7
Panel Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector,
Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, §§ VIII.A.1, VIII.B.1, WT/DS412/R,
WT/DS426/R (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Canada-Renewable Energy Panel Report].
8
Other disputes include commencement of trade remedies cases by the United States in January
2012 against Chinese and Vietnamese wind turbines, by China in June 2012 against American and
South Korean polysilicon producers, and by India in November 2012 against Chinese, American,
Malaysian, and Taiwanese manufacturers of solar modules. In addition, a dispute of what we label the
“Classic” variety also occurred between the EU and others over the EU’s proposed aviation emissions
trading scheme. More details about each of these cases will be discussed later in the Article.
9
See infra Part II.C.
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impacts on the environment, because they concern dirty production and the
renewable technologies held out as necessary to combat climate change.
And like the industrial policies of the past, they too are giving rise to
contentious trade disputes because they flout established trade norms of
nondiscrimination and “fair” pricing. This is giving rise to a set of what we
call “Next Generation” trade and environment conflicts. This Article
examines how Next Generation conflicts significantly raise the stakes for a
trade war and will dominate the trade and environment discourse for the
coming decade. We believe that they force a profound reevaluation of our
assumptions about trade and environment disputes in four key ways:
First, the geopolitical dynamics of trade and environment conflicts are
becoming more complex. Developed and developing countries alike are
embracing green industrial policies that run up against and, in some cases,
clearly conflict with trade disciplines. The earlier cases of the 1990s
presented a simple North–South divide. In “Classic” trade and environment
disputes such as Tuna/Dolphin10 and Shrimp/Turtle,11 developed countries
used border-access measures to improve the environmental behavior of
developing-country trading partners. Today, though, the North–South
divide of the earlier era has disappeared. Both developed and developing
countries are adopting green industrial policy tactics that benefit the
environment but upset trade rules.
Second, these conflicts are radically reconfiguring the domestic
political economy surrounding trade and environment policymaking. The
temporary “green–blue” alliance of convenience—composed of labor,
domestic industry, and environmental groups—that emerged in past trade
and environment disputes risks disintegrating as a result of the Next
Generation cases. Labor unions are now leading the charge against foreign
green industrial policies, while domestic industries are split depending on
their position in the supply chain. Interestingly, most environmental groups
have refused to engage, greeting the recent spate of litigation with near
deafening silence—a dramatic shift from their earlier activism.
Third, the scope of the applicable law is expanding, with major
implications for how adjudicators should balance competing trade and
environmental interests. The Classic cases relied on General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX exceptions and an implicit balancing
test between the sovereign right of governments to protect the environment
against the need to avoid protectionist policies hindering trade.12 The green
industrial policies challenged in Next Generation cases, by contrast,
10

Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report].
11
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle AB Report].
12
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
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involve local-content requirements, conditional subsidies, tax rebates, and
artificial limits on inputs. None of the disciplines governing these trade
measures involves a balancing test. So long as there is a prima facie
violation of a trade obligation, the environmental policy must be
eliminated. This is true no matter the size of the environmental harm
addressed or the environmental benefit of the measures. In addition,
judicial rulings in Next Generation cases have made clear that some
countries—in particular, China—possess less room to implement measures
to protect the environment than others, having bargained it away as the
price for joining the WTO.
Finally, the forum choices for litigation are also expanding. Prior
disputes were litigated solely through multilateral dispute settlement (i.e.,
the GATT and its successor, the WTO), but this is no longer the case. Next
Generation conflicts, unlike their predecessors, are increasingly being
litigated through domestic administrative proceedings, known as trade
remedies cases. The result is that countries are now taking unilateral legal
action against their competitors’ green industrial policies, increasing the
odds of a green trade war.
The impact of these profound shifts is not well understood and has
received scant scholarly consideration to date. On the surface, it appears
that the values of the trade regime—emphasizing nondiscrimination, trade
liberalization and flexibility to counteract “dumping” of goods at unfair
prices—are triumphing over the value of global environmental protection.
Already, WTO rulings have outlawed local-content requirements on
Canadian feed-in tariffs and Chinese export restrictions on raw materials—
purportedly enacted for environmental reasons—because of their
protectionist impact.13 Domestic administrative rulings in the United States
have levied higher tariffs on cheap solar panels and wind turbines from
China, raising the cost and slowing the pace of solar installations in the
United States. The EU also has imposed tariffs on Chinese solar panel
producers that refuse to limit their exports and sell above a certain
minimum price. China, meanwhile, has imposed similar tariffs against
foreign renewable energy products, and India may soon follow as well.
Indeed, the few scholars following these cases have called for reform of the
laws implicated by environmental disputes at the WTO so as to mitigate
environmental harm, though political economy constraints make this
unlikely.14
13

Canada-Renewable Energy Panel Report, supra note 7; Appellate Body Report, China—
Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R,
WT/DS398/AB/R (Jan. 30, 2012) [hereinafter China-Raw Materials AB Report].
14
See, e.g., Luca Rubini, Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, the SCM
Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 525 (2012); Aaron Cosbey, Renewable
Energy Subsidies and the WTO: The Wrong Law and the Wrong Venue, SUBSIDY WATCH (Global
Subsidies Initiative, Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switz.), June 2011, at 1.
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We advance a counterintuitive argument. While trade interests will
almost always triumph over environmental interests in Next Generation
cases, we demonstrate that the practical damage to environmental priorities
from WTO cases will often be much less than feared. Unlike the import
measures at issue in the Classic cases, but like many other industrial policy
measures, the legally problematic element of a Next Generation measure
can be severed from the rest of the policy without sacrificing the
environmental benefits altogether. Furthermore, in many instances,
loopholes in WTO law allow the losing party to continue advancing
elements of the green industrial policy—albeit in a different and potentially
more costly, but WTO-compliant, mode. Therefore, the urgency to amend
WTO rules may not be as great as some contend.
The real point of worry arising from the growing volume of Next
Generation conflicts is the group of trade remedies cases brought through
domestic administrative proceedings. Because these trade disputes are
brought against companies and not governments, the options for
postjudgment compliance differ. As we will demonstrate, all of a
company’s compliance options are likely to trigger a loss in environmental
welfare. Consequently, the environmental harm from trade remedies cases
is likely to be much greater than that from WTO cases.
Complicating this situation further is the fact that a choice of forum is
not necessarily available in all instances. Instead, the available forum or
fora depend on the facts of the case. As a result, the desired solution is not
as simple as channeling cases away from domestic trade remedies
proceedings and toward WTO litigation. The latter may be foreclosed in
certain instances.
All this suggests that the existing calls to reform trade law to
accommodate Next Generation environmental concerns have been
misdirected. Rather than advocating reforms of WTO law, as the few
scholars focused on this area have proposed, we contend that both
environmentalists and fair trade advocates would be better served by
narrowly amending domestic trade remedies regulations to prevent a
harmful green trade war. Our arguments, therefore, are both descriptive and
prescriptive.
Part I sets forth the Classic model of a trade and environment dispute,
describing the significant cases of the 1990s and the common features of
these conflicts. We do not argue that the Classic model is disappearing
altogether. Indeed, it continues to resonate in proposals to address climate
change through border measures. Importantly, though, Classic disputes are
no longer the only game in town, nor even the dominant one.
Part II examines the rise of green industrial policies around the globe.
Describing the causes for their growth, we present a framework for
understanding the different types of instruments used to promote green
industrial policy, such as subsidies and export restrictions. We identify the
trade law issues raised by such policies, giving rise to a series of Next
407
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Generation cases. Finally, we highlight the two different fora through
which litigation of such disputes can be pursued—at the WTO or through
domestic courts—and the details of the cases to date.
Whether measured numerically or by impact, the Next Generation
disputes already comprise the lion’s share of trade and environment
litigation over the past five years. Part III analyzes the implications of this
shift. Juxtaposing the Next Generation cases against the Classic cases, we
explore the four major developments noted above. These cases are:
(1) eroding the North–South divide of the Classic cases and complicating
geopolitical dynamics, (2) reshaping the domestic political economy by
threatening alliances among interest groups, (3) upending the balancing
mechanism found in prior jurisprudence by implicating new treaty
provisions, and (4) driving adjudication outside the WTO to domestic
administrative courts. Taken together, they are leading to rulings less
favorable to environmental interests.
In Part IV, we make a prescriptive argument, contending that
individuals interested in reforming trade law to accommodate
environmental interests should place greater emphasis on reforming trade
remedy laws for conflicts adjudicated at the domestic level. This includes
introducing limits on trade remedies for environmental goods (in terms of
quantity, timing, and/or scope) and rebating tariff revenue to consumers to
offset higher costs. Such reform proposals have been all but neglected to
date.
In short, a profound shift is under way in the field of trade and
environment disputes. This Article explores the rise of Next Generation
conflicts, proposes a framework for thinking about them, explains why this
matters, and sets out a new vision of what we should be doing about it.
I.

THE CLASSIC VIEW OF TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES

A. The Conventional Beliefs Arising out of the Classic Cases
The trade and environment debate first emerged more than two
decades ago, when a series of disputes highlighted the tension between the
competing goals of trade liberalization and environmental regulation. These
initial conflicts shared a common narrative: rich developed countries, often
the United States, enacted domestic environmental measures such as
protecting dolphins in the tuna fishery or reformulating for cleaner burning
gasoline. These countries worried, however, that the new regulations would
place their domestic producers at a competitive disadvantage if their
trading partners did not adopt similar requirements. To ensure a level
playing field, the measures included restrictions banning imported products
that did not meet similar environmental criteria. Market access served as a
carrot to improve environmental practices.
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In reaction, poor exporting countries denounced these restrictions as a
neocolonial stick, a protectionist barrier to keep their economies down.
They attacked the restrictions as illegal under trade law and challenged the
environmental conditions before the GATT and its successor, the WTO.
This dynamic was repeated in the three most important trade and
environment cases of the 1990s: Tuna/Dolphin, Shrimp/Tuna, and U.S.Gasoline.15
Tuna/Dolphin addressed the use of purse-seine nets for tuna fishing.16
These nets often ensnared and drowned hundreds of thousands of dolphins
that swam above the tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. The U.S. had
banned the use of such nets for its domestic fleet, but most countries
continued the practice. In 1988, Congress amended the Marine Mammal
Protection Act, requiring that any country exporting tuna to the U.S. certify
that its fleet was not causing greater dolphin mortality than the U.S. fleet.17
The new law effectively banned tuna from any country using purse-seine
nets as well as from all other intermediary countries that imported tuna
from the uncertified country. Mexico challenged the law before the GATT
as illegal discrimination.18

15

To be clear, environmental concerns have surfaced in other WTO cases besides these three
Classic cases. Yet, in many of these “related” cases, a major motivation behind the ban was the negative
impact on health, with the environment serving as a secondary argument. For example, in the 2003–
2006 dispute, EC-Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (also known as the “Genetically
Modified Organisms” (GMO) case), several countries challenged the European Communities’ (EC)
general moratorium on the approval of genetically modified food products. One of the reasons given by
the EC to justify its moratorium was the need for precaution because of the uncertain impact the
introduction of GMOs would have on the environment. A primary driving force behind the EC’s
precautionary principle was not environmental protection, however, but concerns over human and
animal health. See Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) (adopted
Nov. 21, 2006). A similar concern over health was at the heart of the EC-Asbestos dispute concerning a
French decree banning the import and sale of asbestos fibers. See Appellate Body Report, European
Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 2, 168,
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). Similarly, the Brazil-Retreaded Tyres dispute of 2005–2008 was
focused primarily on health concerns, even though Brazil also raised points about the environmental
impact of tire imports. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, ¶¶ 119, 129, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
16
Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 2.1–2.9.
17
Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-711, § 4, 102 Stat. 4755,
4765 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423h (2012)). The MMPA states that “[t]he
Secretary of the Treasury shall ban the importation of commercial fish or products from fish which have
been caught with commercial fishing technology which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious
injury of ocean mammals in excess of United States standards.” 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (2006).
18
Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 1.1, 3.1.
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The Shrimp/Turtle dispute followed a similar fact pattern.19 Trawlers
fishing for shrimp were inadvertently catching and drowning endangered
sea turtles. Congress mandated that American shrimp boats equip their
trawling gear with “turtle excluder devices” (TEDs) that allow turtles to
escape. Many countries’ fleets did not adopt TEDs and, to level the playing
field and strengthen global protections for sea turtles, the U.S. Congress
passed an amendment to the Endangered Species Act in 1989 banning
imports of shrimp from countries that could not certify that their shrimp
fisheries did not threaten endangered sea turtles.20 In practice, this meant
that foreign shrimp producers needed to prove their fleets were using
TEDs. India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand brought suit, challenging
the U.S. ban for violating trade rules.21
A similar issue arose in U.S.-Gasoline.22 In 1994, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued the Gasoline Rule, aimed
at reducing vehicle emissions of toxic air pollutants and ozone-forming
volatile organic compounds.23 The Rule mandated that all gasoline sold in
the United States needed to conform to minimum “cleanliness”
requirements as defined from a historic 1990 baseline.24 Most American
refineries were allowed to use an individualized 1990 baseline, but most
foreign producers were required to meet a general statutory baseline based
on the average quality of U.S. gasoline in 1990, regardless of their own
particular situation.25 Developing countries protested this difference as
discriminatory, with Brazil and Venezuela leading the charge.26
19

Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
¶¶ 2.4–2.14, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report]; Shrimp/Turtle AB
Report, supra note 11, § I.
20
This U.S. amendment is referred to as Section 609. Sea Turtle Conservation Amendments to the
Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037 (1989) (amending 16 U.S.C.
§ 1537).
21
Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶¶ 2.7, 3.1.
22
Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶¶ 2.5–
2.7, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996); Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, § I.B, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.-Gasoline AB
Report].
23
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
59 Fed. Reg. 7716, 7716 (proposed Feb. 16, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
24
Id. at 7716–17. No refinery was permitted to sell gasoline anywhere in the U.S. that was “dirtier”
than the 1990 baseline. In addition, no refinery was allowed in certain urban areas unless it reduced
emissions of particular pollutants by at least 15% against the 1990 baseline. Id. at 7716–17, 7851–52,
7856–57.
25
U.S.-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 22. The Gasoline Rule sorted all gasoline refineries into
one of two categories. Those in the first category were permitted to define their 1990 baseline on an
individualized basis using refinery-specific quality data. Those in the second category were obliged to
use a statutory baseline for their 1990 baseline, meaning that their baseline was based on the average
quality of gasoline sold in the U.S. by all producers in 1990. To sort a refinery into one category or the
other, the EPA considered various criteria which differed depending on whether the refinery was
domestic or foreign. Id. This led to more American refineries being able to use an individualized
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In all three cases, the GATT/WTO ruled in favor of the developingcountry complainants.27 Despite differences in their process and production
methods, adjudicators found that the products were “like” goods under
international trade law and in breach of the nondiscrimination obligation of
GATT Articles I and/or III.28 In turn, the U.S. tried to assert the defenses
available under GATT Article XX.29 Article XX(b) provides an exception
for trade restrictions “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health,”30 while Article XX(g) provides an exception for measures “relating
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”31
In evaluating a defense, an adjudicator engages in a two-part analysis.
First, she determines whether the policy truly serves the substantive
purpose being claimed—does it genuinely relate to conservation of an
exhaustible resource or is it truly necessary to protect human life? If so,
then the adjudicator must examine whether the measure nevertheless acts
as “a disguised restriction on international trade” or was implemented in a
discriminatory manner.32 This two-step evaluation is often referred to as a
balancing test, weighing the legitimacy of the environmental policy
challenged against its potential negative impact on trade.33 In all three
cases, adjudicators found that the United States did not qualify for the
Article XX defenses.34
The decisions in these so-called Classic cases were hugely influential,
seizing the attention of both the environmental and academic communities,
baseline than foreign refineries. In May 1994, the EPA proposed to amend the Gasoline Rule so that the
criteria used to determine whether a foreign refinery could use an individualized baseline would be
made similar to the criteria employed for domestic refineries. However, this proposal was ignored by
Congress, which enacted legislation in September 1994 denying the EPA funding to implement its May
1994 proposal. Id.
26
Id. at 1.
27
Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶ 7.1; Shrimp/Turtle AB Report, supra note 11,
§ VII; U.S.-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 22, § V.
28
Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶ 5.9; Shrimp/Turtle AB Report, supra note 11,
§ VI.C.2, ¶ 23; U.S.-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 22, §§ I.C, III.C. GATT Article I, which enshrines
the most-favored-nation treatment principle, prohibits WTO members from discriminating between
their trading partners with respect to “like” products. GATT, supra note 12, art. I. Similarly, GATT
Article III, which enshrines the national treatment principle, prohibits WTO members from
discriminating between imported and domestically produced goods if they are “like” products with
respect to fiscal charges, laws, and regulations. Id. art. III.
29
Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶ 5.22; Shrimp/Turtle AB Report, supra note 11,
§ II.A.2; U.S.-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 22, at 7, 21.
30
GATT, supra note 12, art. XX(b).
31
Id. art. XX(g).
32
Id. art. XX.
33
See ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 358–59, 367
(2d ed. 2012); WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: GATT Exceptions, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
34
Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶ 7.1(a); Shrimp/Turtle AB Report, supra note 11,
§ VII; U.S.-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 22, § V.
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and quite literally creating the field of trade and environment law. Within a
remarkably short period, environmental groups hired trade lawyers and
launched campaigns directed toward the threat that “GATTzilla” posed to
the environment while a flood of scholarship assessed the uneasy
relationship between environmental protection and trade protectionism.35
The Classic cases were often portrayed in the United States as
faceless, international bureaucrats obstructing the efforts of good,
developed countries to protect the environment from bad, developing
countries.36 Within developed countries, the import bans enjoyed
widespread support among unlikely allies in the domestic political
economy. Environmental and animal rights groups welcomed them as a
way to gain leverage over otherwise recalcitrant foreign governments.37
Antiglobalization groups resented the influence of international
organizations on national policy decisions.38 Domestic producers supported
the restrictions because they leveled the playing field.39 And labor unions
endorsed them because they helped keep jobs at home. No other policy
issues aligned these disparate groups’ interests so closely, and the political
alliance proved potent. During the 1999 WTO Ministerial (the so-called
“Battle in Seattle”), hundreds of environmental and antiglobalization
protesters dressed up as sea turtles, marching alongside members from the
Teamsters and United Steelworkers.40 These public protests derailed the
start of a new round of trade negotiations and threatened the public
legitimacy of the young WTO institution, just four years old at the time.
Despite the loud protests, an uneasy truce prevailed in the ensuing
decade. While, on the surface, all three cases involved a loss for
environmentalists, the jurisprudence quietly shifted. The Appellate Body’s
35

See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT (1994); Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair
Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 459, 524–25 (1994); Aaditya
Mattoo & Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade, Environment and the WTO: The Dispute Settlement Practice
Relating to Article XX of GATT, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 327 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997); Russell Norman, GATTzilla Versus
Flipper, GREEN LEFT, Sept. 7, 1994, at 13, available at http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/8219.
36
For example, the Earth Island Institute ran a full-page advertisement showing a sea turtle trapped
in a fishing net with the headline in bold, “Why should we let a bunch of World Trade Organization
bureaucrats determine the fate of our earth?” DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 1241 (4th ed. 2011) (reproducing the advertisement).
37
ELIZABETH R. DESOMBRE, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
INDUSTRY, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, AND U.S. POWER 246 (2000).
38
The Public Citizen website, for example, declares that “[h]istorically, the Venezuela Gas, TunaDolphin and Shrimp-Turtle cases revealed a systemic bias in the WTO rules and the WTO dispute
resolution process against the rights of sovereign states to enact and effectively enforce environmental
laws.” WTO and Environment, Health & Safety, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/
ENVIRONMENT (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
39
DESOMBRE, supra note 37.
40
Kit Oldham, WTO Meeting and Protests in Seattle (1999)—Part I, HISTORYLINK.ORG (Oct. 13,
2009), http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?displaypage=output.cfm&file_id=9183.
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approach in Shrimp/Turtle represented a departure from the earlier cases,
opening the door for countries to regulate trade to advance environmental
protection.41 Additionally, the WTO publicly took steps to affirm that trade
rules are not antithetical to environmental protection.42 Over time,
environmental groups came to realize that the threat of trade law was not as
dire as they had once feared.43
Though trade and environment disputes largely faded into the
background after 2000, the conventional assumptions of the Classic cases
have persisted.44 Developed countries still consider themselves the leaders
in advancing global environmental protection, at times resorting to tariffs
and trade restrictions on imports to encourage developing countries seen as
unwilling to do their share. Trade law is still suspected as favoring trade
liberalization over environmental protection, limiting the ability of
countries to regulate the environmental practices of their trading partners
because of fears of protectionism. And GATT Article XX remains the
arbiter, balancing environmental protection against trade protectionism
when conflicts arise.
B. The Resurgence of Classic Assumptions in the Climate Change Debate
The Classic assumptions about trade and environment disputes have
been reinforced in recent years by climate change policy debates. Those
countries considering greenhouse gas reduction measures and carbon taxes
have sought to ensure a level playing field with competitors who have no
41

For anyone interested in understanding the change in approach further, see, for example, Steve
Charnovitz, The WTO’s Environmental Progress, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 685, 695 (2007), which argues
that “the generally well-thought-out Appellate Body decisions” in the Classic cases “inspired
confidence in the adjudication process, and convinced many environmentalists that legitimate
environmental measures would be permitted by the WTO”; Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings
in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 491, 516 (2002), which argues that the Appellate Body’s Shrimp/Turtle jurisprudence “swept
away almost all the pillars of the GATT anti-environmentalist edifice”; and John H. Knox, The Judicial
Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 29–42
(2004), which describes these cases as reinterpreting the GATT and leading to “the [g]reening of [t]rade
[j]urisprudence.”
42
See WORLD TRADE ORG., TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT AT THE WTO 6–7 (2004) (noting that
while “the WTO is not an environmental protection agency,” WTO rules “provide significant scope for
Members to adopt national environmental protection policies”).
43
Telephone Interview with David Hunter, Professor of Law, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law &
Former Exec. Dir. of the Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law (May 2, 2012).
44
The Tuna/Dolphin debate has persisted as well, now entering its third decade of dispute, most
recently over U.S. regulations governing the use of a “dolphin-safe” label on tuna cans. Again, a
developing country, Mexico, challenged the legality of the pro-environmental regulation, with the WTO
again ruling in its favor. In May 2012, the Appellate Body (AB) held that although dolphin protection
was a legitimate objective, the U.S. regulations are discriminatory and therefore illegal. Appellate Body
Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Products, ¶¶ 1–3, 342, 407–08, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin AB
Report].
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such policies and therefore lower production costs. In ongoing multilateral
negotiations, for example, China and India have refused to adopt
immediately binding commitments for greenhouse gas reductions, arguing
that their developing-country status and need for economic growth rule out
such measures.45 Frustrated, developed countries are considering and, in
some cases, adopting unilateral measures to encourage carbon-reducing
behavior by trading partners. The U.S. Congress convened hearings to
examine what types of border restrictions could be adopted in conformity
with WTO law,46 while the European Commission also held public
consultations over its proposed regulations.47 Again, the same message is
being delivered as in the Classic cases: if you want access to our markets
for your products and services, then you need to take action or be subject to
border measures.
This time, the main tool has been a carbon emissions trading scheme
(otherwise known as “cap and trade”). In the United States, such programs
featured prominently in the failed 2009 Waxman–Markey bill.48 The
legislation adopted by the House of Representatives contained a section
requiring importers to purchase greenhouse gas allowances if the exporting
country did not have a similar greenhouse gas reduction program in place.49
Since 2005, the EU has implemented the Emissions Trading System
(ETS). Each year, the European Commission establishes a “cap” on the
total amount of carbon emissions allowed in a given industry and then
apportions a finite number of tradeable emission allowances to companies
within that industry.50

45

John M. Broder, At Climate Talks, a Familiar Standoff Between U.S. and China, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2011, at A18; India Did Not Pledge to Legally Binding Commitments on Emissions:
Government, JAGRAN POST (Dec. 17, 2011, 12:29 AM), http://post.jagran.com/india-did-not-pledge-tolegally-binding-commitments-on-emissions-government-1324061976.
46
Hearing on Trade Aspects of Climate Change Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 8, 42, 50–52, 77, 81 (2009).
47
For a list of public consultations that the European Commission held, including several
concerning its ETS scheme, see Closed Consultations, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/consultations_en.htm#closed (last updated Dec. 20, 2013).
48
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 701, 703
[hereinafter Waxman–Markey]. See also the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-andtrade initiative to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector by 10% in Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
Memorandum of Understanding, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/design/
history/mou (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
49
Waxman–Markey, supra note 48, § 722.
50
At the end of the year, a company has to surrender enough allowances to cover its emissions or
face heavy fines. Council Directive 2009/29, arts. 14, 16, 2009 O.J. (L 140) (EC); Council Directive
2003/87, arts. 11, 14, 16, 2003 O.J. (L 275) (EC); Questions and Answers on the Revised EU Emissions
Trading System, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/faq_en.htm (last updated
Dec. 17, 2008).
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In 2008, the European Parliament decided to extend the ETS to
airlines’ greenhouse gas emissions for flights into Europe beginning in
2012, requiring allowances for the carbon emitted during the entire flight,
not simply over European airspace.51 Worried that the scheme would
disadvantage European airlines, the EU extended it to include foreign
airlines. Although the scheme involves emission allowances rather than a
direct import ban or tariff, its spirit is similar to that of the border measures
at issue in the earlier Classic disputes. The EU is leveraging its market
power to compel behavioral change beyond its borders. If an airline wishes
to fly into European airspace, then it must reduce its carbon emissions or
incur a cost (through purchase of additional emissions allowances or
payment of a fine to the Commission for exceeding its allowances).
The EU’s trading partners responded with virulent protests.
Developing countries led the charge. India threatened to ban EU airlines
from Indian airspace as retaliation, with the country’s Aviation Minister
warning, “Travelling is always a two-way traffic . . . . If they can impose
sanctions so can other countries.”52 China’s state-run press similarly issued
blunt warnings that developed countries should not risk a trade war over “a
trade barrier in the name of environmental protection.”53 Already, China
has ordered its airlines not to pay the emissions tax,54 with other countries
following suit.55 Russia convened a meeting of opposing countries to
consider eleven potential retaliatory measures against the EU.56 Together,
they have persuaded more than twenty countries—including developed
countries like the U.S. and Japan—to declare their opposition.57 In
November 2012, the EU retreated, suspending the policy for a year.58
51

Council Directive 2008/101, art. I, 2009 O.J. (L 8) (EC).
Chetan Chauhan, India Gets Support of Basic Countries Against EU’s Carbon Tax, HINDUSTAN
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012, 9:20 PM), http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/India-getssupport-of-Basic-countries-against-EU-s-carbon-tax/Article1-811467.aspx; James Fontanella-Khan et
al., India Warns EU over Airline Carbon Tax, FIN. TIMES (May 24, 2012, 7:12 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aceffc00-a58d-11e1-a77b-00144feabdc0.html (quoting Civil Aviation
Minister Ajit Singh).
53
Simon Rabinovitch, China Warns EU of Carbon Tax ‘Trade War,’ FIN. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2011,
12:12 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/49ab64c8-2c92-11e1-aaf5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2fpDfx
2TM.
54
Joshua Chaffin, China Creates Aviation Turbulence, FIN. TIMES (U.S. ed.), Feb. 7, 2012, at 5;
Joe McDonald, China Bars Its Airlines from Paying EU Carbon Tax, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 6, 2012.
55
For example, legislation was introduced in the U.S. Congress exempting U.S. airlines from
paying the tax. See John Crawley, Congress to Oppose EU Law on Aircraft Emissions, REUTERS, Jan.
31, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-usa-airlines-eu-idUSTRE81003Y
20120201.
56
Pilita Clark, Alliance Fights EU Carbon Tax on Airlines, FIN. TIMES (U.S. ed.), Feb. 18, 2012,
at 3.
57
Joint Declaration of the Moscow Meeting on Inclusion of International Civil Aviation in the EUETS, Feb. 22, 2012, http://www.greenaironline.com/photos/Moscow_Declaration.pdf.
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Joshua Chaffin & Andrew Parker, Brussels Freezes Airline Carbon Charge, FIN. TIMES (U.S.
ed.), Nov. 13, 2012, at 2.
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As with the earlier Classic cases, developed countries are employing
unilateral measures to encourage more environmentally friendly behavior
in exchange for market access. These measures to address global
environmental problems are denounced by trading partners as illegal under
international trade law.59 The Classic form of a trade and environment
dispute, and the assumptions that follow from them, remain alive and well.
The problem, though, is that Classic disputes are no longer the only, or
even the most important, game in town.
II. THE RISE OF GREEN INDUSTRIAL POLICY
As both the European aviation dispute and the latest chapter of the
Tuna/Dolphin case60 make clear, the Classic form of trade and environment
disputes continues to remain relevant. But we contend that this dominant
narrative has become outdated. Another strand of conflicts has emerged in
the past five years—the aggressive promotion by both developing and
developed countries of industrial policies with environmental benefits and
protectionist results. This development lies at the heart of what we call the
Next Generation of trade and environment disputes. Since 2008, green
industrial policies have already given rise to twelve significant trade and
environment conflicts.61
As we shall discuss, the Next Generation cases give rise to profoundly
different legal and policy implications than the Classic cases. Countries,
along with environmental groups, face an uncomfortable choice: should
they be willing to sacrifice certain free trade principles in exchange for
increased environmental action? Or should such principles prevail even if
they slow efforts to tackle environmental problems? Part II discusses the
causes underlying the rise of green industrial policies, the tactics employed
in such policies, and the trade conflicts they have spawned.
A. Why Have Green Industrial Policies Emerged?
Industrial policy, as Dani Rodrik proclaimed in 2010, is back.62 Out of
favor for many years in the shadow of “free market” acolytes, industrial
policy is the principle that governments should actively and intentionally
intervene to encourage the development of key domestic manufacturing
59

For a discussion of trade-related concerns, see, for example, LORAND BARTELS, THE INCLUSION
AVIATION IN THE EU ETS: WTO LAW CONSIDERATIONS 8–27 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable
Dev. Issue Paper No. 6, 2012); Joshua Meltzer, Climate Change and Trade—The EU Aviation Directive
and the WTO, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 111, 123–56 (2012). Note that although the dispute shares the
attributes of a Classic case, the underlying treaty (i.e., the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS)) is different because the dispute concerns a service rather than a good.
60
See Tuna/Dolphin AB Report, supra note 44.
61
See infra Part II.C.
62
Dani Rodrik, The Return of Industrial Policy, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-return-of-industrial-policy.
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sectors. The use of industrial policy is, of course, not new. But most
recently, it has taken on a decidedly “green” tinge. Governments are
applying industrial policy strategies in renewable energy and extractive
resource industries. As a result, the industrial policy issues that played out
in earlier trade conflicts in semiconductors and automobiles are now
working their way into trade and environment disputes.
The primary factors driving the fusion of environmental and industrial
policy domains have been political economy pressures, technological
change, and concerns over energy security. Thanks to decades of research,
technological advances have lowered the cost of renewable energy sources
and made their adoption less cost prohibitive.63 At the same time,
governments are finding it harder to justify spending to support renewable
energy policies on environmental grounds alone. In an era of rising fiscal
austerity, the question of “what’s in it for us” takes on greater political
salience in every debate over public spending.
To justify spending on environmental policies, governments
increasingly need to ensure some payoff for their constituencies. In order to
gain public support, governments are embedding spending on renewable
energy projects within an overarching industrial policy designed to create
high-paying “green-collar” jobs.64 In addition, governments are
emphasizing the fact that such programs are good for national security
because they reduce dependence on foreign sources of energy.65 This too
raises the importance of ensuring that the manufacturing to support the
renewable energy sector remains local.
For developing economies, such as China and India, an industrial
policy targeting renewable energy carries an additional benefit—the
opportunity to move up the value chain and gain market leadership in
emerging manufacturing sectors.66 Of the seven strategic industries targeted
in China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP), three involve renewable
63

Felix Mormann & Dan Reicher, Op-Ed., How to Make Renewable Energy Competitive, N.Y.
(June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/opinion/how-to-make-renewable-energycompetitive.html?pagewanted=all.
64
See, e.g., The Right Honourable David Cameron, Speech at the Sustainable Consumption
Institute Conference: The Green Consumer Revolution (Oct. 16, 2009) (noting “the importance of
individual governments showing leadership” and emphasizing the creation of 70,000 jobs while
advancing environmental goals).
65
Claudette Roulo, Clean Energy Tied to National Security, Official Says, DEFENSE.GOV (Feb. 7,
2013), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119237 (noting the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs’ remarks “that the motivation for seeking out clean
energy sources is strongly rooted in national security interests”).
66
China, for example, has adopted an automobile-emissions standard that is stricter than the United
States’. This may stem from concerns over local pollution or, additionally, be the result of an export
strategy for domestically manufactured vehicles that can be sold directly on the European market and
satisfy their stringent emissions requirements. David Green, Experts Say Beijing’s New Auto Emissions
Standards to Ripple Through China, WARDSAUTO (Feb. 21, 2013), http://wardsauto.com/asia-pacific/
experts-say-beijing-s-new-auto-emissions-standards-ripple-through-china.
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energy.67 India’s Eleventh FYP included a comprehensive program to
bolster capabilities in solar, wind, biomass, hydropower, and energy
storage.68 Recently, India’s Planning Commission announced that spending
targeted at renewable energy would further increase in the Twelfth FYP.69
While, at least temporarily, the words “industrial policy” and
“renewable energy” may trigger negative associations in the American
public’s mind after the Solyndra fiasco, within academic and policy circles,
resistance to industrial policy is eroding.70 There is a growing recognition
that industrial policy, when executed well under certain circumstances, can
be effective.71 Germany’s success to date in creating renewable sector jobs
and manufacturing leadership through an active industrial policy, in
particular, has attracted much attention from others intent on replicating the
recipe for its success.72 Governments worldwide are keen to grow their
economies while implementing green policies—even if it requires their
active intervention.
B. How Is Green Industrial Policy Being Deployed?
No one-size-fits-all formula exists for sparking the growth of key
strategic industries. The strategies vary, depending on the sector and actors
involved, but they draw on a basic set of policy tools. In this section, we set
out the major instruments applied in green industrial policies—some
67

These are: (1) the “[e]nergy conservation and environmental protection industries,” (2) “new
energy” industries (e.g., wind, solar, biomass, etc.), and (3) “new-energy” automobiles. THE TWELFTH
FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA (2011–2015) pt. III, ch. 10 (English Section of the Cent. Document Translation Dep’t of the
Cent. Compilation & Translation Bureau trans., 2011).
68
GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP
ON NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY FOR THE XITH FIVE YEAR PLAN (2007–12) (2006).
69
Increasing Productivity Is Aim of 12th Plan: Srivastava, TIMES INDIA (Dec. 8, 2012, 10:58 PM),
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-12-08/guwahati/35688793_1_12th-plan-renewableenergy-productivity.
70
Solyndra is an American solar panel manufacturer. The company received over $500 million in
loan guarantees from the U.S. Department of Energy before filing for bankruptcy in 2011. It has been
held out by some as an example of why the government should not support start-up renewable energy
companies. See Ronald D. White, Solar Firm to Cease Operations, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, at B2.
71
See, e.g., Ann Harrison & Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, Trade, Foreign Investment, and Industrial
Policy for Developing Countries, in 5 HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 4039 (Dani Rodrik &
Mark R. Rosenzweig eds., 2010). The World Bank’s former chief economist has himself endorsed
industrial policy as playing a key role in transforming economies, but noted that such efforts must be
properly aligned with a country’s resource base and factor endowments. Justin Yifu Lin, Industrial
Policy Comes Out of the Cold, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/industrial-policy-comes-out-of-the-cold. For an endorsement specific toward addressing
environmental issues, see Philippe Aghion et al., The Environment and Directed Technical Change
(GRASP Working Paper No. 21, 2011).
72
See, e.g., Priya Barua et al., Delivering on the Clean Energy Economy: The Role of Policy in
Developing Successful Domestic Solar and Wind Industries (World Res. Inst. Working Paper, 2012),
available at http://pdf.wri.org/delivering_clean_energy_economy.pdf.
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targeting nascent renewable energy sectors directly, others drawing on
quasi-environmental policies to advantage key high-tech industries. We
also explore the constraints imposed by WTO law on each particular form
of industrial policy.
1. Sector-Targeted Subsidies.—The most common, and blunt, form
of industrial policy is a general subsidy provided to the targeted sector. For
green industrial policy, three types of targeted subsidies are common. The
first is general research and development subsidies to firms, universities,
and other institutions engaged in renewable energy research. The second is
financial subsidies, such as low-interest or guaranteed loans, equity
infusions, and tax credits, given directly to firms. The third is feed-in-tariff
(FIT) programs. A FIT refers generally to a series of policies taken to
provide a long-term financial incentive for generation of renewable energy.
For example, one version of a FIT is to provide a guaranteed price for
renewable energy supplied to the grid through a long-term contract; the
price is almost always higher than the prevailing market price for energy
supplied from nonrenewable sources. This guarantee helps to offset the
higher costs faced by renewable energy producers. By eliminating this cost
disadvantage, the hope is that a FIT will spur greater investment and
innovation in renewable energy.73
Green energy subsidies have grown rapidly in recent years, from $39
billion in 2007 to $66 billion in 2010.74 The International Energy Agency
(IEA) projects them to grow to almost $250 billion by 2035.75 More than
half of the world’s renewable energy subsidies are supplied by EU
countries, with the EU and the United States collectively accounting for
80% of all renewable energy subsidies in 2010.76 Other countries actively
deploying major subsidies for renewable energy industries include Japan,
Canada, and South Korea.77 Additionally, over sixty-five countries employ
a FIT for renewable energy.78 These include several EU member states,
Canada, Japan, Australia, Israel, and numerous U.S. states.79 Overall, the
FIT approaches taken by European countries have been among the most

73

For a short overview, see, e.g., JULIE TAYLOR, FEED-IN TARIFFS (FIT): FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS FOR STATE UTILITY COMMISSIONS (2010). For a more extensive discussion of the design
and financing of feed-in-tariff programs, see WILSON RICKERSON ET AL., UNITED NATIONS ENV’T
PROGRAMME, FEED-IN-TARIFFS AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT FOR PROMOTING RENEWABLE ENERGIES
AND GREEN ECONOMIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2012).
74
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011, at 508, 530 (2011).
75
Id. at 530–31.
76
Id. at 530.
77
See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, GLOBAL CLEAN POWER: A $2.3 TRILLION OPPORTUNITY 46, 60,
68 (2010).
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REN21, RENEWABLES 2012 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 14 (2012).
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Id. at 14, 118 tbl.R12.
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varied and effective.80 Germany’s program, in particular, has attracted
much positive attention, transforming Germany into an export leader for
environmental goods.81
While the bulk of subsidies are provided by advanced economies,
China and India are also significant players. China’s Golden Sun program
subsidizes up to 70% of the installation cost for off-grid solar and up to
50% of the installation, transmission, and distribution costs of a gridconnected solar array.82 Initiated in 2009, the program covers almost 300
solar projects worth nearly $3 billion.83 In addition, China provides
subsidies through FIT programs for wind energy and biomass electricity.84
In 2011, India announced that it had provided $51 million in subsidies, up
63% from the previous year.85 India’s FIT programs subsidize solar,
biomass-electricity, hydropower, and wind energy projects.86 According to
IEA projections, China will be the third largest provider of renewable
energy subsidies by 2015, and India will be the fourth largest by 2025, if
not sooner.87 Collectively, they will account for at least 20% of global
subsidies.88
Undoubtedly, subsidy programs have played a key role in spurring the
growth of renewable energy industries, with positive benefits spilling over
beyond national borders. The diminishing cost of solar and wind power
worldwide is due, in part, to aggressive Chinese subsidies that have
triggered a supply glut and price war.89 Consumers around the globe are
enjoying cheaper clean energy, often thanks to industrial policies
elsewhere.90
80

See, e.g., ARNE KLEIN ET AL., EVALUATION OF DIFFERENT FEED-IN TARIFF DESIGN OPTIONS—
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16, 2009).
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2012, at B1.
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While some form of government intervention may be necessary in the
face of market failure, in practice, subsidy policies can reflect rent seeking
by domestic industries. As a result, WTO rules place constraints on the use
of subsidies, but do not ban them outright. The rules governing subsidies
are set out in a separate agreement, outside of the GATT, known as the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).91
The SCM Agreement only disciplines subsidies that specifically target
certain enterprises or apply specific criteria.92 If such subsidies are
contingent upon export performance or local-content requirements, they are
impermissible.93 Otherwise, they fall into the broad category of
“actionable” subsidies in WTO parlance.
These “actionable” subsidies are permissible under WTO law so long
as they do not negatively harm the trade interests of other countries. A
government may petition to declare another government’s subsidy illegal if
it can demonstrate that the subsidy has “adverse effects to the interests of
other [WTO] Members.”94 It may also take unilateral actions in domestic
administrative courts against another government’s subsidy if it finds that
“the effect of the [actionable subsidy] is such as to cause or threaten
material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to prevent
or materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry.”95
In addition, subsidies may enable a producer to sell at a lower price
than would otherwise be the case. WTO law also includes the possibility
projects-rose-67-percent-in-fourth-quarter-seia-says.html; Ian Steadman, European Solar Power
Capacity Keeps Increasing Despite Subsidy Cuts, WIRED UK (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/
news/archive/2012-09/25/solar-power-austria-europe.
91
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM
Agreement]. A subsidy is defined under WTO law as “a financial contribution by a government or any
public body” that confers a “benefit.” Id. art. 1.1. The term “financial contribution” encompasses most
forms of what are typically considered to be subsidies, such as grants, loans, equity infusions, tax
credits, loan guarantees, etc. Four specific categories of “financial contribution” are elaborated upon in
Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)–(iv) of the SCM Agreement. Any such financial contribution confers a “benefit”
whenever it is given “on terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the market.”
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 157,
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999). In addition, case law has clarified that the term “public body” covers
any “entity that possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority.” Appellate Body Report,
United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China,
¶ 317, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011).
92
The SCM Agreement explicitly states that its rules only apply to subsidies that are “specific.”
Three types of subsidies are automatically deemed specific: export subsidies, local-content subsidies,
and subsidies “limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical region within the
jurisdiction of the granting authority.” See SCM Agreement, supra note 91, arts. 1.2, 2.2–2.3 & 3. The
criteria for considering specificity of other forms of subsidies outside of these three types are spelled
out in Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement. See id. art. 2.1.
93
See id. art. 3.
94
Id. art. 5. Three examples of “adverse effects” are spelled out in the SCM Agreement. See id.
95
GATT, supra note 12, art. VI:5.
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for unilateral action in domestic administrative courts when the price is so
low that the exporter is considered to be “dumping” its product into a
market.96 Again, a petitioner must demonstrate that the dumped goods
“cause or threaten material injury.”97 Petitions seeking relief from
actionable subsidies and dumping may be filed simultaneously.
These avenues for litigation, as we shall see, have opened the door to
several trade remedies cases filed against producers subsidized through
green industrial policies. What began as a trade spat over green subsidies
between the United States and China spilled over in 2012 to encompass a
much wider range of countries, including the EU, India, South Korea,
Taiwan, Malaysia, and Vietnam.98
2. Conditional Local-Content Subsidies and Policies.—A second
instrument that has featured prominently in green industrial policy is the
local-content subsidy, defined under WTO law as a subsidy “contingent . . .
upon the use of domestic over imported goods.”99 In the green industrial
policy context, the subsidy may take the form of a rebate to consumers of
renewable energy products, a guaranteed purchase price to suppliers of
renewable energy, and/or a preferential loan or grants to renewable energy
producers. Receipt of this subsidy is conditioned on the use of a certain
percentage of local, rather than foreign, products or inputs.100
Local-content requirements are popular with industrial policymakers
because they impart significant direct and indirect benefits. First, they
boost demand for domestically produced goods, even if the domestic good
is inferior in quality to a foreign import. So long as the cost of the marginal
difference is less than the size of the subsidy, a rational buyer will choose
the domestic good, with resulting gains in employment. Depending on the
size of the demand distortion, it even may allow the domestic industry to
achieve certain benefits of scale. It can also increase local capacity gained
by learning through doing that boosts the competitiveness of domestic
firms.
Second, the local-content subsidy may induce upstream foreign
producers to establish production facilities inside the country in order for
their products to count toward the local-content requirement. So long as the
expected marginal cost of the foreign facilities and training the new work
force is less than the expected marginal gain, such a shift in the foreign
firm’s production location makes rational sense. Increased foreign
96

Id. art. VI.
Id.
98
See infra notes 219–22 and accompanying text.
99
SCM Agreement, supra note 91, art. 3.1(b).
100
For a more detailed discussion of local-content requirements as applied to renewable energy
sectors, see JAN-CHRISTOPH KUNTZE & TOM MOERENHOUT, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE
DEV., LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS AND THE RENEWABLE ENERGY INDUSTRY—A GOOD MATCH?
(2013).
97
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investment creates even more local “green collar” jobs. It may also induce
technology transfer through formal or informal channels.101 Finally, it may
lead to the diffusion of certain nontechnological, sector-specific expertise
(e.g., forecasting or supply chain management skills) that will boost the
competitiveness of local firms.
However, such subsidies are clearly trade distortive. They induce
substitution away from otherwise more efficient imports toward less
efficient domestic goods. As a result, they are one of two forms of
subsidies banned outright under the SCM Agreement.102 Beyond subsidies,
policies that generally require the use of a fixed volume or percentage of
local content are also prohibited outright under WTO law.103 Thus, even if
the program does not meet the legal requirement for a subsidy, it is still
likely impermissible.104
Despite local-content requirements being illegal per se, they have
featured prominently in renewable energy policies worldwide. They have
found favor with a wide range of governments in both developing—and
perhaps more surprisingly—developed countries. Governments offering
benefits for use of locally produced goods in their renewable energy
programs include Brazil, China, Croatia, France, Greece, India, Italy,
Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, and several U.S. states and Canadian provinces.105
Below, we describe a few of these programs in greater detail.
The earliest program to attract a trade challenge was a FIT scheme
implemented by Ontario. Having campaigned on a platform of a “Greener
Ontario,” the ruling Liberal Party implemented a FIT to spur renewable
energy investment.106 However, the program came with a catch. To qualify
for the FIT, after 2011, a solar energy producer must source at least 60% of
its components from Ontario, while for large-scale wind energy producers,
the threshold is 50%.107
101

An example of a formal channel is if the foreign producer decides to enter the market through a
joint venture arrangement, in which its technology is then shared with the joint venture partner. An
example of an informal channel is through the diffusion of technological expertise by ex-employees of
the foreign investor who acquire familiarity with the technology during the course of their employment.
102
SCM Agreement, supra note 91, art. 3.
103
See GATT, supra note 12, art. III.3.
104
We note this because a contentious issue in the Canada-Renewable Energy case is whether the
FIT amounts to a subsidy.
105
For a comprehensive discussion of such policies, see KUNTZE & MOERENHOUT, supra note 100,
at 13–30; Heymi Bahar et al., Domestic Incentive Measures for Renewable Energy with Possible Trade
Implications (OECD Trade & Env’t Working Papers No. 2013/01, 2013).
106
ONTARIO LIBERALS, MOVING FORWARD, TOGETHER: THE ONTARIO LIBERAL PLAN, 2007
HIGHLIGHTS 1, 5 (2007).
107
The minimum amount of Ontario-sourced content varies depending on a number of factors,
including the renewable energy source (solar vs. wind), the scale of the project, and the year in which
commercial operations begin. An exception is made for wind-power projects with a contract capacity
under 10kW. See Ontario Power Authority, Feed-In-Tariff Program FIT Rules Version 1.5.1 (July 15,
2011), at 16. Small-scale solar projects are subject to their own requirements.
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The Liberals sought to spur job creation through pro-environmental
policies designed to catapult Ontario to the forefront of clean technology
manufacturing in North America.108 By that measure, the local-content
requirements have been successful. In the first year alone, ten solar energy
manufacturers and several wind energy and solar inverter companies
“committed to set[] up solar module assembly plants in Ontario to meet”
the requirement.109 The most visible of these is a multi-billion dollar deal
with Korean manufacturer Samsung to build wind and solar energy plants
in the province.110
India has embraced a similar strategy. Despite its promising geography
and climate for solar power, India has lagged dramatically behind other
countries in developing a solar panel industry. Inspired by others, in 2010
the government launched a FIT program that conditioned receipt of the
subsidy on the use of Indian components.111 The government made no
secret that this was part of its industrial policy, stating that the reason for
the local-content requirements was to promote domestic manufacturing in
the solar energy industry to help Indian manufacturers catch up to their
foreign competitors.112

108

ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, GO GREEN: ONTARIO’S ACTION PLAN ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 14 (2007).
109
Tyler Hamilton, Energy Program a Good FIT for Ontario, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 27, 2010,
at B1.
110
Robert Benzie & Tyler Hamilton, Premier to Unveil Samsung Green Deal, TORONTO STAR,
Jan. 20, 2010, at A4; Samsung Invests $7B in Ontario Wind & Solar, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM
(Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2010/01/samsung-invests-can7b-in-ontario-wind-and-solar; Samsung, Ontario Sign $3 Billion Wind, Solar Deal,
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/
article/2011/08/samsung-ontario-sign-3-billion-wind-solar-deal.
111
The exact domestic-content requirements vary over time. In order to qualify to bid for a FIT rate
in the first year of Phase 1 of the program (FY 2010–2011), the solar energy supplier must use
photovoltaic modules manufactured in India. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NAT’L SOLAR MISSION, MINISTRY
OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY, BUILDING SOLAR INDIA: GUIDELINES FOR SELECTION OF NEW GRID
CONNECTED SOLAR POWER PROJECTS BATCH-II, at 7 (2011), http://mnre.gov.in/file-manager/UserFiles/
jnnsm_gridconnected_24082011.pdf. By the second year of Phase 1 (FY 2011–2012), the requirement
expands to include not only Indian-manufactured photovoltaic modules, but also photovoltaic cells. Id.
at 7–8. Government officials have already announced that in later phases, as the technological prowess
of Indian manufacturers expands, they plan to expand the domestic-content requirements to include
other components such as inverters, the production of which is more technology intensive. See Natalie
Obiko Pearson, India May Extend Local Equipment Usage Rule for Solar Power Beyond 2013,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2010, 5:06 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-13/india-mayextend-local-equipment-usage-rule-for-solar-power-beyond-2013.html; Abhishek Shah, Solar Energy in
India—Domestic Content Requirements May Be Made More Stringent for Longer Time, GREEN WORLD
INVESTOR (Dec. 13, 2010), http://greenworldinvestor.com/2010/12/13/solar-energy-in-india-domesticcontent-requirements-may-be-made-more-stringent-for-longer-time.
112
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NAT’L SOLAR MISSION, MINISTRY OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY,
TOWARDS BUILDING SOLAR INDIA 2, 7 (2010), http://www.mnre.gov.in/file-manager/UserFiles/mission
_document_JNNSM.pdf.

424

108:401 (2014)

The Rise of Green Industrial Policy

The local-content requirement has been a boon to Indian domestic
manufacturers facing a cost disadvantage relative to foreign competitors
(particularly those from China).113 Without the local-content requirement
for the FIT, India’s solar energy producers would likely purchase imported
photovoltaic modules and cells. Because the benefits from the FIT more
than offset the higher cost of buying domestic, energy producers now have
an incentive to buy domestic components, instead.
Some governments simply provide bonuses for local-content use,
rather than making it a threshold eligibility criterion for the FIT. Italy and
Greece, for example, give higher FIT rates to producers that source a given
percentage of their components from within the EU.114 Among developing
countries, Turkey and Malaysia employ a similar scheme.115
Nor are all local-content requirements tied to a FIT. China, for
example, offered outright grants to individual wind turbine manufacturers
ranging from $6.7 million to $22.5 million.116 The catch was that to qualify,
a company needed to submit copies of receipts showing that they had
purchased certain components made in China. Foreign companies could
also qualify, but only if they shifted their component manufacturing to
China. For China, the local-content requirement has been instrumental to
its industrial policy’s success. Its benefits include greater employment,
technology transfer, and increased global market share. The program’s
impact is positive for the environment as well. Thanks to Chinese
subsidies, wind turbines are now cheaper and therefore more widely

113

Meredith Connolly, Mixed Reactions to India’s Solar Domestic Content Requirement,
SWITCHBOARD (Jan. 9, 2012), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/mconnolly/mixed_reactions_to_indias
_sola.html (noting that some domestic firms view the local-content requirement as necessary in light of
foreign competition).
114
Nomos (2012:4062) Aξιοποίηση του πρώην Αεροδρομίου Ελληνικού−Πρόγραμμα
ΗΛΙΟΣ−Προώθηση της χρήσης ενέργειας από ανανεώσιμες πηγές (Ενσωμάτωση Οδηγίας
2009/28/ΕΚ)−Κριτήρια Αειφορίας Βιοκαυσίμων και Βιορευστών (Ενσωμάτωση Οδηγίας 2009/30/ΕΚ)
[Development of the Athens former international airport HELLINIKON–PROJECT
HELIOS−Promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (integration of Directive
2009/28/EC)–Sustainability criteria of biofuel and bioliquids (integration of Directive 2009/30/EC)],
EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 2012, A:70, art. 39, para.
12 (Greece); Decreto Ministeriale 5 maggio 2011, n. 11A06083, art. 14(1)(d), in G.U. May 12, 2011, n.
109 (It.); Decreto Ministeriale 5 luglio 2012, n. 12A07629, art. 4(5)(d), in G.U. July 10, 2012, n. 159
(It.). The Italian program offers an additional premium for producers whose facilities use Europeanmade modules and inverters. Id. arts. 2(1)(v) & 5(2)(a).
115
Paul Gipe, Turkey Adopts Limited Feed Law, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Jan. 17, 2011),
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/01/turkey-adopts-limited-feed-law; Paul
Gipe, Malaysia Adopts Sophisticated System of Feed-in Tariffs, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/04/malaysia-adoptssophisticated-system-of-feed-in-tariffs; see also infra notes 147 and 149.
116
Sewell Chan, U.S. Says China Fund Breaks Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2010, at B1.
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adopted.117 These gains, however, have come at the expense of foreign
producers and foreign workers. Producers incur the cost of shifting
production to China, while workers have lost their jobs outright.
Practices in certain U.S. states offer an example of yet another form of
a local-content subsidy—one targeting consumers rather than producers.
Five U.S. states provide direct rebates to customers who switch over to
certain renewable energy technologies.118 Like the Italian and Greek
programs, the U.S. state programs provide an additional bonus for
customers using equipment manufactured in state. These range from as low
as 12.5%–20% (Massachusetts, California, Ohio)119 to as high as 120%–
240% (Washington)120. While the overt justification for these subsidies is
environmental, the goals of job creation and keeping in-state manufacturing
figure prominently in justifying these public expenditures.
By lowering the cost of renewable energy production and/or
consumption, each of the local-content programs provides positive
environmental benefits. The problem is that each is conditioned on a tradedistortive policy designed to favor local producers over foreign imports.
Not surprisingly, they have led to a series of WTO challenges, which we
discuss later in the Article.
3. Export Restrictions.—The green industrial policies described
above have been designed to boost the competitiveness of domestic
renewable energy sectors. China, in particular, has implemented a third
form of green industrial policy instrument with a different objective in
mind. This involves placing restrictions on the export of scarce natural
resources in the hopes of boosting the competitiveness of downstream
domestic industries that rely on these resources as inputs. The export
restrictions are enacted through a quota, a tax, or a combination of the two.
117

Kari Williamson, Overcapacity and New Players Keep Wind Turbine Prices Down,
RENEWABLE ENERGY FOCUS (May 3, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/25560/over
capacity-and-new-players-keep-wind-turbine-prices-down.
118
For example, California provides rebates to customers installing one of nine types of
technologies. See CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY CAL., SELF-GENERATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM
HANDBOOK 1 (2011). New Jersey and Washington provide incentives for solar and wind energy
installations, while the Massachusetts program is only for solar and Ohio’s is only for wind. See
Renewable Energy System Cost Recovery, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-273 (2012); AMY
GOMBERG, ENV’T OHIO, OHIO’S WIND ENERGY FUTURE (2007); MASS. CLEAN ENERGY CTR.,
COMMONWEALTH SOLAR II PHOTOVOLTAIC REBATE PROGRAM: PROGRAM MANUAL (2012),
http://masscec.live.getfused.com/masscec/file/CSII_Solicitation_V10_Final.pdf; N.J.’S CLEAN ENERGY
PROGRAM, RENEWABLE ENERGY INCENTIVE PROGRAM GUIDEBOOK 6–7 (2009), http://www.njcleanen
ergy.com/files/file/Renewable_Programs/CORE/REIPGuidebookfinal0202mq.pdf.
119
See Strickland, Fisher Announce Wind Production and Manufacturing Incentives, GOVERNOR
TED STRICKLAND (Feb. 8, 2007), http://www.tedstrickland.com/2-8-07-strickland-fisher-announcewind-production-and-manufacturing-incentives; MASS. CLEAN ENERGY CTR., supra note 118, at 8;
CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY CAL., supra note 118, at 28–29. Note that the additional incentive in
California is subject to a cap. See CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY CAL., supra note 118, at 27.
120
See Renewable Energy System Cost Recovery, supra note 118, § 14(d).
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Among the resources that China has restricted are a set of nine minerals
and a group of “rare earth” elements.121 China has attempted to justify its
restrictions, in some instances belatedly, as pro-environmental.122 The
process of extracting and refining the elements causes ecological damage
and poses grave environmental risks. For example, the extraction and
processing of rare earths produces a radioactive waste product that can
contaminate local water sources123 and increase cancer incidences.124 Export
restrictions artificially constrain production, thereby diminishing
environmental harm. As such, they are indeed environmentally
beneficial.125
The problem is that they introduce a trade-related market distortion.
Only foreign consumers find themselves supply constrained and facing
higher prices. Moreover, the same environmental objectives could be
accomplished through a production, rather than an export, restriction, but
without the negative trade impact. The latter point has raised doubts over
whether environmental concerns truly motivate China’s export restriction
policies.126
Why is China resorting to export restrictions rather than production
limits? To understand China’s viewpoint, consider the pattern of overall
global mineral extraction. Today, China bears a disproportionate share of
the world’s “dirty” mining. With only one-third of global reserves, China
supplies 97% of the world’s rare earths.127 The United States, once the
world’s leading producer, shut down all production in 1998, following
121

The nine minerals at issue in the China-Raw Materials case on which China imposed export
restraints were “bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal, yellow
phosphorus and zinc.” See Panel Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, ¶ 2.1, WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (July 5, 2011) [hereinafter China-Raw
Materials Panel Report]. The elements at issue in the China-Rare Earths case include “various forms of
rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum.” See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—
Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, 1, WT/DS431/1 (Mar.
15, 2012) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter China-Rare Earths Request for Consultations (U.S.)].
122
Peter Cai & Georgia Wilkins, China Cites Environment to Justify Grip on Rare Earths, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, June 21, 2012, at 5.
123
Lisa Margonelli, Down and Dirty: Hybrid Cars and Wind Turbines Need Rare-Earth Minerals
that Come with Their Own Hefty Environmental Price Tag, ATLANTIC, May 2009, at 17, 17–18.
124
See Lei Wu et al., [A Case-Control Study on the Risk Factors of Leukemia in Mining Areas of
Rare-Earth in South Jiangxi] 24 ZHONGHUA LIU XING BING XUE ZA ZHI (中华流行病学杂志)
[Chinese J. Epidemiology] 879, 879–82 (2003).
125
This is assuming no production capacity constraint. In the face of such constraint, it is possible
that increased domestic demand might substitute for reduced export opportunities, thereby eliminating
the environmental gains.
126
See, e.g., John W. Miller, Protectionism Hurts Effort to Pressure China, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,
2010, at A15.
127
China Announces Second Rare Earth Export Quota for 2012, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Aug.
23, 2012, 8:18 AM), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/7920534.html; Nick Valéry, The
Difference Engine: More Precious than Gold, ECONOMIST BABBAGE BLOG (Sept. 17, 2010, 6:22 PM),
http:///www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/09/rare-earth_metals.
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environmental outcry over a radioactive spill into a California desert.128 The
same story is true of other raw materials such as fluorspar.129 Other than
Spain, no industrialized country mines fluorspar because of the associated
environmental hazards, even though both the United States and France
have an ample base of reserves.130
As China has grown wealthier and its domestic manufacturing base
has expanded, its policymakers ask: Why should China aggressively mine
an exhaustible natural resource—and incur the resultant environmental
harm—simply to supply the world market, when the rest of the world
refuses to do so?131 Why not limit the use of exhaustible natural resources
to its home market, as the United States has done with liquefied natural
gas?132
For Chinese policymakers, a key factor in analyzing the cost–benefit
equation at hand is whether the minerals are used domestically or exported.
Under both scenarios, the costs are the same: upstream extraction and
processing generates negative environmental externalities. However, the
offsetting benefits differ greatly, at least in Chinese eyes, depending on
whether the mineral is subsequently exported for use by a foreign
manufacturer or kept for domestic use.
When kept in China, the downstream Chinese manufacturer later
remits taxes back to the Chinese government on profits made from use of
the mineral as an input. Although such taxes are not designated for
environmental cleanup, they increase the central government’s fiscal
capabilities to cover remediation costs. The same is not true of an overseas

128

Mike Alberti, Digging a Deep Hole: Rare Earths Debacle Puts U.S. Trade Policy Under
Scrutiny, REMAPPING DEBATE, Jan. 11, 2011; Katherine Bourzac, Can the U.S. Rare-Earth Industry
Rebound?, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/421472/can-theus-rare-earth-industry-rebound (noting that in the 1970s and 1980s, the United States produced over
seventy percent of the world’s supply).
129
Fluorspar is used to manufacture a wide range of products including “aluminum, gasoline,
insulating foams, refrigerants, steel, and uranium fuel.” Minerals Information: Fluorspar Statistics and
Information, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/fluorspar.
130
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES
2008, at 63 (2008). We use the year 2007 because this is the year prior to China’s policy shift on raw
materials. See China-Raw Materials Panel Report, supra note 121, ¶ 2.4 (listing various measures that
were implemented beginning in 2008 that were challenged in the subsequent WTO case).
131
David Stanway & James Regan, Pollution the Big Barrier to Freer Trade in Rare Earths,
REUTERS, Mar. 19, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/19/us-china-rareearth-id
USBRE82I08I20120319 (noting that “Chinese officials insist [that] the country’s dominance” in rare
earths trade “is no longer anything to celebrate” as it has come with a heavy environmental price).
132
Under the 1938 Natural Gas Act, companies must obtain an export license for liquefied natural
gas. Some have suggested that the current policy which benefits U.S. domestic firms, if left unchanged,
would make it difficult for the United States “to argue against China’s restrictions on exports of rare
earth minerals.” See Richard McGregor & Ed Crooks, Obama Backs Rise in US Gas Exports, FIN.
TIMES (U.S. ed.), May 6, 2013, at 1.
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manufacturer who needs not remit any share of its profits to the Chinese
government.
More importantly, the extracted minerals serve as key inputs for
several strategic industries, such as defense, high tech, and
pharmaceuticals. When kept in China, the inputs presumably increase
Chinese capabilities in these sectors and generate positive spillover effects
for the rest of the economy (through supply chain linkages, innovation,
jobs, etc.).133 For example, lanthanum extracted from Chinese mines is a
key input for Chinese manufacturing of rechargeable car batteries.134 This,
in turn, has sparked the development of an electric car industry in China
and innovation in hybrid technologies.
Put crudely, China’s view is that so long as the mineral is consumed
within its borders, the positive externalities that emerge from domestic
downstream use will more than compensate for the negative externalities
that result from upstream extraction.135 Potentially environmentally harmful
acts are acceptable if they trigger greater downstream benefits that will
more than cover the remediation costs. However, once the mineral is
exported, China fails to capture any positive downstream externalities but
is left with the cost of upstream environmental harm.136 Export restrictions,
unlike overall production limits, allow China to account for this
difference.137
China’s trading partners, however, suspect that the real drivers are
geopolitics and industrial policy. During a territorial dispute with Japan in
133

For an overview of the role played by select metals and minerals in aiding the development of
key strategic industries, see Jane Korinek & Jeonghoi Kim, Export Restrictions on Strategic Raw
Materials and Their Impact on Trade and Global Supply, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 255, 257–59 (2011).
134
On the importance of lanthanum for hybrid car batteries, etc., see Maggie Koerth-Baker, 4 Rare
Earth Elements that Will Only Get More Important, POPULAR MECHANICS, http://www.popular
mechanics.com/technology/engineering/news/important-rare-earth-elements (last visited Mar. 2, 2014);
Stephen Kurczy, Top 5 ‘Rare Earth’ Minerals: What Are They?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 21,
2010, 2:13 PM), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/1021/Top-5-rare-earth-mineralsWhat-are-they/Lanthanum; see also Ucilia Wang, China Sets New Record for Renewable Energy
Storage, FORBES (Jan. 4, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/01/04/chinasets-new-record-for-renewable-energy-storage (describing China’s ambitions to build a battery industry
for renewable energy).
135
Interview with Advisor to Chinese Government (2011-G1).
136
An environmental input–output analysis found that the largest driver of China’s increasing
carbon emissions is its changing export composition, for which metal products accounted for the largest
percentage increase in the proportion of export value. See Ming Xu et al., CO2 Emissions Embodied in
China’s Exports from 2002 to 2008: A Structural Decomposition Analysis, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 7381
(2011).
137
China is not alone in applying export restrictions on natural resources. “More than one-third of
all notified export restrictions are in resource sectors,” and export taxes are twice as likely in this sector
as compared to other sectors. Michele Ruta & Anthony J. Venables, International Trade in Natural
Resources: Practice and Policy 12–13 (WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2012-07, 2012). However,
these restrictions pose special legal problems for China on account of its Protocol of Accession. See
infra text accompanying note 143.
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late 2010, for example, China cut off all exports of rare earth minerals to
Japan, forcing Japan eventually to relent.138 In addition, the export
restrictions have created a pricing dynamic where foreign downstream
industries pay more for raw material inputs than their Chinese competitors.
Some contend that China is using the shortage of rare earth exports and raw
materials as a tool to entice foreign high-tech firms to relocate their
manufacturing operations to China.139 This, in turn, would give China
greater access to downstream technologies.140 Finally, the higher prices for
rare earth exports and raw materials provide Chinese downstream
producers with a cost advantage for inputs over their foreign competitors.
WTO law places limits on the use of certain forms of export
restrictions. GATT Article XI prohibits the use of export quotas and export
bans, except under certain limited conditions.141 Because this is a GATT
provision, unlike the subsidy provisions, it is subject to the balancing test
of GATT Article XX exceptions. Export taxes, on the other hand, are
another matter. In general, WTO members are allowed to apply “duties,
taxes or other charges” on exports.142 However, Article 11.3 of China’s
Protocol of Accession states that “China shall eliminate all taxes and
charges applied to exports” unless certain exceptions apply.143 These
provisions have provided grounds for China’s trading partners to challenge
its export restrictions at the WTO.
*

*

*

When one surveys the range of green industrial policy instruments that
have been deployed—from taxes and subsidies to quotas and bans—four
points become clear. First, the common perception that China and India are
refusing to address global environmental problems144 is incorrect. Their
138

See Keith Bradsher, In Dispute, China Blocks Rare Earth Exports to Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 2010, at B1. Days after the embargo was imposed, Japan released the captain of the Chinese fishing
vessel seized in the disputed territorial waters. See Chico Harlan & William Wan, Chinese Boat Captain
Is Released, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2010, at A7. The territorial issues over the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands remain unresolved.
139
Keith Bradsher, China Tightens Grip on Rare Minerals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at B1.
140
Sudeep Reddy & Jared A. Favole, Obama to Push China on Minerals, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13,
2012, at A1 (citing a research note by Professor Scott Kennedy for an economics consulting firm that
highlighted this as an objective of the Chinese government’s rare earth policy).
141
GATT, supra note 12, art. XI(1).
142
Id.
143
These exceptions are if the export taxes or other charges are “specifically provided for in . . .
this Protocol or applied in conformity with the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994.” See
Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, art. 11.3, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001).
144
See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn, Climate Policy: Separating Fact from Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 557, 571–72 (2009) (“[M]any, such as China and India, do not perceive it in their interest to sign
an agreement today that would require them to take costly actions. . . . They are not willing to sacrifice
growth today for the benefit of future generations . . . .”); Christine McIsaac, Opening a GATE to
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governments are forging ahead with a wide range of pro-environmental
policies, deploying hundreds of millions of dollars in support. Despite
having an economy half the size of the United States, China now leads the
world in renewable energy investments, spending 53% more than the
second-ranked United States.145
Second, they are not doing so out of altruistic concern or a sense of
global responsibility. Instead, they are intentionally enacting industrial
policies designed to benefit their economic competitiveness. Positive
environmental gains are simply a corollary benefit. Although their
governments will not articulate it this bluntly, their pragmatic message is
essentially: We are willing to do our part to address the world’s
environmental problems. But our per capita carbon emissions are still
vastly lower than those who point fingers at us for not doing our share. As
developing countries, we have not been the primary contributors of
environmental harm to date, nor have we enjoyed much of the economic
gains derived from these impacts. To address a problem we neither caused
nor benefited from, we expect to be compensated meaningfully through
financial and/or technology transfer. And if industrialized countries are
unwilling to do so, then we will take action only when it serves our own
domestic economic interests, particularly when it strategically advantages
our nascent manufacturing sectors.
Third, other developing countries are taking notice and following suit.
Although we focused primarily on examples in China and India, they are
far from alone: Brazil adopted a local-content requirement as part of its
preferential development loan program.146 In 2010, Turkey revised its
renewable energy law to include a local-content premium in its FIT
scheme.147 Ukraine did the same in 2011.148 Similarly, Malaysia’s new

Reduce Global Emissions: Getting over and into the WTO, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 1053, 1072–73 (2010)
(describing the “New Major Players” such as China, India, and Brazil as “free riders”); Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 905, 908 (2008).
145
China first overtook the United States in renewable energy investment in 2009, but relinquished
its lead in 2011 on account of the United States’ one-time stimulus spending that year. In 2012, China
invested $67.7 billion, compared with $44.2 billion by the United States. See Pilita Clark, China Heads
Renewable Energy Spending, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2013, at 17. For information about the size of each
economy, see World Economic Outlook Database: October 2012 Edition, INT’L MONETARY FUND
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx.
146
To qualify for a loan from Brazil’s development bank, BNDES, wind turbine manufacturers are
required to source initially “40% of their components from Brazilian suppliers,” with the requirement
eventually increasing to 60%. ERNST & YOUNG, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS
INDICES 29 (2012).
147
Law on Utilization of Renewable Energy Sources for the Purpose of Generating Electrical
Energy, Law No. 5346, art. 6/B & sched. II (Dec. 29, 2010) (Turk.).
148
Vitaliy Radchenko, Ukraine—Change to Local Content Requirement for Renewable Energy
Sector, JD SUPRA L. NEWS (June 22, 2011), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ukraine-change-to-local
-content-requir-77720.
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Renewable Energy Act, passed in 2011, includes a sophisticated schedule
with bonuses for use of local components.149
Finally, green industrial policies have also emerged in developed
economies from Europe to North America. The policy justifications may
vary, from ensuring energy security and economic competitiveness to
delivering on political promises to create high-paying “green collar” jobs
and, of course, environmental protection. The bottom line is that green
industrial policy has gone global.
C. Green Industrial Policy and Trade Disputes
Not surprisingly, the proliferation of green industrial policy has led to
a renewed outbreak of trade litigation related to environmental matters. As
explained above, many, perhaps most, of the pro-environmental policies
discussed above are illegal under WTO rules. In this section, we highlight
the two primary forms of trade actions countries have used to challenge
their trading partners’ green industrial policies. Not only are formal
conflicts over Next Generation cases on the rise, but the litigation fora in
which such cases are being fought are also expanding.
1. Multilateral Action: WTO Dispute Settlement.—The most obvious
forum for a country to address green industrial policies that violate WTO
rules is the WTO itself.150 The WTO offers several benefits—it is a
multilateral forum, it oversees both negotiation and judicial interpretation
of international trade rules, and it offers binding dispute resolution.151
Several options exist within the WTO. The softest approach is for a
country to express its concern during regular meetings of a WTO
committee. For example, a country may raise qualms over another
country’s subsidies for renewable energy industries in the Committee on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The United States has used this
forum to call on China and India to provide additional notification for over
200 of its subsidies programs, many of which are provided through local
governments and some of which have environmental implications.152 The
EU, Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, and Turkey joined
the United States’ request.153
149

Renewable Energy Act 2011, Act 725, Schedule (Section 2) (Malay.).
This is subject to the caveat that all parties to the dispute are WTO members.
151
See WORLD TRADE ORG., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION . . . IN BRIEF (2009),
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf.
152
See Request from the United States to India Pursuant to Article 25.10 of the Agreement,
Subsidies, G/SCM/Q2/IND/20 (Oct. 10, 2011); Request from the United States to China Pursuant to
Article 25.10 of the Agreement, Subsidies, G/SCM/Q2/CHN/42 (Oct. 11, 2011).
153
See WTO Comm. on Subsidies & Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the Regular Meeting
Held on 26–27 October 2011, ¶¶ 111–17, 120–24, G/SCM/M/79 (Feb. 2, 2012); WTO Comm. on
Subsidies & Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 26 April 2012, ¶¶ 52–
56, 59–64, G/SCM/M/81 (July 25, 2012).
150
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Another mechanism is to raise concerns during a country’s Trade
Policy Review. Each WTO member’s trade policies are reviewed on a
regular basis, and trading partners may use this review to inquire into
questionable trade policies. For example, in September 2011, the United
States took advantage of this mechanism to express concern that the localcontent requirements of India’s FIT “explicitly shut out imports,”
criticizing it as comparable to the “trade-restrictive policies pursued in
previous, poorly-performing periods of India’s economic development.”154
U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk later described India’s unwillingness
to come clean as “intolerable.”155
Finally, a country can choose to file a formal legal complaint through
the WTO’s dispute settlement process. This can lead to hearings before a
dispute panel and the possibility of an appeal before the WTO’s Appellate
Body (AB). Should the panel (or ultimately the AB) find that the defendant
party’s policies are in fact illegal under WTO law, then that country is
given “a reasonable period of time” to bring its policies into compliance
with WTO obligations.156 If a country does so, then no additional legal
remedies are available. In particular, the dispute settlement regime at the
WTO tends not to offer compensatory or punitive relief for past violations.
But if a country continues to breach after the reasonable period has expired,
the complainant may then impose a fixed amount of tariffs against the
defendant’s exports.157
The past three years have witnessed a rapid growth of WTO cases
concerning green industrial policy. The first such dispute, China-Raw
Materials, was filed by the United States and EU against China in June
2009,158 with Mexico later joining as an additional complainant.159 The
panel ruled against China’s export restrictions,160 and the majority of the
154

Ambassador Michael Punke, U.S. Permanent Representative to the WTO, Statement at the
WTO Trade Policy Review of India (Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pressoffice/speeches/transcripts/2011/september/statement-ambassador-michael-punke-wto-tra.
155
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Exec. Office of the President, United
States Details China and India Subsidy Programs in Submission to WTO (Oct. 06, 2011), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/october/united-states-details-china-andindia-subsidy-prog.
156
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 21, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
157
For additional details of this institutional design, including an analysis of the implications and
shortcomings, see Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law
Enforcement, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 102 (2011).
158
Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/1 (June 25, 2009); Request for Consultations by the European
Communities, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS395/1
(June 25, 2009).
159
Request for Consultations by Mexico, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various
Raw Materials, WT/DS398/1 (Aug. 26, 2009).
160
China-Raw Materials Panel Report, supra note 121, ¶¶ 8.16–8.22.
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panel’s rulings were upheld by the AB.161 The AB also upheld the panel’s
finding that China had bargained away its right to exercise the GATT
Article XX exceptions to justify export taxes as part of its WTO
accession.162
The United States filed a second complaint in December 2010,
challenging the legality of China’s local-content requirements for subsidies
for wind power equipment.163 Interestingly, it was the United Steelworkers,
a labor union, rather than American wind turbine producers, who pressured
the White House to bring the China-Wind Power Equipment case.164 They
worried that the program would cost their workers jobs as American
producers shifted their manufacturing to China to take advantage of the
subsidy. Rather than litigate, China agreed to a settlement in which it
dropped the offending program. The White House declared it a major
victory for ensuring “fairness for American clean technology innovators
and workers.”165
Third, in 2010 and 2011, Japan and the EU challenged the legality of
Ontario’s local-content requirement for its FIT program.166 Japan expressed
concern “about possible proliferation of such protectionist measures all
over the world” and urged the WTO to take action.167 In December 2012,
the WTO panel ruled against Canada, holding that the FIT violated national
treatment obligations under the GATT and the Agreement on TradeRelated Investment Measures.168 The Appellate Body, in May 2013,

161

China-Raw Materials AB Report, supra note 13, ¶ 362.
Id. ¶¶ 279, 284–85, 362.
163
Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Concerning Wind Power
Equipment, WT/DS419/1 (Jan. 6, 2011) [hereinafter China-Wind Power Equipment Request for
Consultations (U.S.)].
164
UNITED STEELWORKERS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: UNITED STEELWORKERS’ SECTION 301
PETITION DEMONSTRATES CHINA’S GREEN TECHNOLOGY PRACTICES VIOLATE WTO RULES (2010),
http://assets. usw.org/releases/misc/section-301.pdf.
165
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Exec. Office of the President, China
Ends Wind Power Equipment Subsidies Challenged by the United States in WTO Dispute (June 7,
2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/june/china-ends-wind
-power-equipment-subsidies-challenged (noting also that the deal “supports well-paying jobs here at
home”).
166
Request for Consultations by Japan, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS412/1 (Sept. 16, 2010); Request for Consultations by the European
Union, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS426/1 (Aug. 16, 2011).
167
Press Release, Ministry of Econ., Trade & Indus., Gov’t of Japan, Request for the Establishment
of a Panel on Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector in Ontario, Canada
(June 1, 2011), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2011/0601_01.html.
168
Canada-Renewable Energy Panel Report, supra note 7, ¶ 7.167. However, a majority of the
panel found that the FIT did not amount to a subsidy as it did not confer a benefit, while one member
sharply dissented. Id. ¶¶ 7.320–7.328, 9.1–9.23.
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reversed parts of the panel decision, but overall, allowed the panel’s ruling
that the measures violated national treatment obligations to stand.169
Fourth, following the China-Raw Materials ruling, the United States,
EU, and Japan each filed complaints in 2012 challenging China’s export
restrictions on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum.170 In March 2014,
the Panel issued a ruling against China, declaring that its export restrictions
violated its WTO commitments.171 At the time of this writing, appeals of
the Panel decision are pending before the Appellate Body.
Fifth, in November 2012, China filed a complaint challenging localcontent restrictions in Europe FITs.172 The case remains at the consultation
stage at the time of this writing.
Sixth, in February 2013, after months of trying to negotiate a
resolution, the United States formally initiated a complaint over India’s FIT
program.173 India has been shoring up its defense for some time in
anticipation of a case,174 and at the time of this writing, the United States,
after unsuccessful consultations, has requested the establishment of a Panel.
In contrast, during the same period of 2009–2013, the WTO handled
only one Classic type of trade and environment case (U.S.-Tuna II175). Next
Generation conflicts have clearly superseded Classic conflicts within the
WTO. WTO litigation is no longer about environmentally contingent
market access policies but, rather, green industrial policies. Given how
many such policies run afoul of WTO rules, we should expect countries to
turn even more to the WTO to force their trading partners to dismantle
these pro-environmental, but quasi-protectionist, policies.
169

Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, ¶¶ 6.1–6.2,
WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R (May 6, 2013).
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China-Rare Earths Request for Consultations (U.S.), supra note 121; Request for Consultations
by the European Union, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and
Molybdenum, WT/DS432/1 (Mar. 15, 2012); Request for Consultations by Japan, China—Measures
Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WT/DS433/1 (Mar. 15, 2012).
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Panel Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and
Molybdenum, WT/DS431/R, WT/DS432/R, WT/DS433/R (Mar. 26, 2014).
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See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Request for Consultations by the United States, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar
Cells and Solar Modules, WT/DS456/1 (Feb. 11, 2013).
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Amiti Sen, India Confronts US, EU at WTO over National Solar Power Generation
Programme, ECON. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011, 4:19 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/
2011-10-26/news/30324230_1_solar-mission-solar-power-solar-projects; Amiti Sen, India to Defend
Local-Buy Policy in Solar Mission as US, EU Protest, ECON. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012, 3:21 AM),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-02-03/news/31021273_1_solar-mission-traderelated-investment-measures-solar-energy.
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Panel Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of
Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011); Appellate Body Report, United States—
Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products,
WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012).
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2. Unilateral Action: Trade Remedies Cases.—Multilateral action,
however, carries real costs. It is time-consuming and resource intensive. In
addition, the WTO dispute settlement process does not readily offer the
prospect of retrospective damages.176 Some countries, frustrated with
trading partners’ industrial policies and unwilling to wait for the WTO to
proceed through its long dispute settlement process with no clear prospect
of damages, are resorting to unilateral action instead.
WTO law permits a country to take unilateral action under certain
circumstances. First, a domestic industry must file a case with the
government petitioning for increased tariffs against its trading partner. A
government may also proactively begin investigating a case ex officio. This
case is then adjudicated through a domestic administrative proceeding.
Provided certain conditions are met, a country may then impose unilateral
tariffs against goods from its trading partner found to be in violation.
Collectively, such actions are known as trade remedies.177
Two forms—the countervailing duty (CVD) and the antidumping
duty—are particularly important in this context.178 A CVD case may be
filed against producers benefiting from a subsidy, while an antidumping
case may be filed against any producer “dumping” a good onto a market.
That is, both CVD and antidumping complaints are lodged against foreign
companies directly, rather than against the foreign governments.
Dumping is defined as pricing below the “normal value” of a
product;179 thus, antidumping cases, at least in theory, target foreign firms
that “dump” their products below market rates, ostensibly to take over the
domestic market. CVD cases aim to stem the effects of impermissible
subsidization. In both instances, the effect of the subsidy or dumping must
be to cause or threaten “material injury to an established industry” or to
“materially retard[] the establishment of a domestic industry.”180 If this can
be proven, a unilateral tariff may be imposed to offset the negative impact
of the subsidy or “dumping.”181 This tariff may be kept in place
indefinitely, but must be reviewed every five years.182

176

The vast majority of cases impose prospective remedies that commence from the expiry of the
“reasonable period of time.” A few cases from the GATT era deviate from this practice. For a more
complete discussion, see PETROS C. MAVROIDIS ET AL., THE LAW OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (WTO) 1084 (2010).
177
Besides increased tariffs, a trade remedy may also take the form of a quantitative restriction if
imposed as a safeguard. See GATT, supra note 12, art. XIX.
178
A third form is a safeguard, but because the standards for obtaining relief under WTO safeguard
provisions are more difficult to satisfy, it is not frequently used as a trade remedy. See Chad P. Bown,
Why Are Safeguards Under the WTO So Unpopular?, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 47 (2002).
179
GATT, supra note 12, art. VI:1.
180
Id. art. VI:1 & VI:6(a).
181
Id. art. VI:2 & VI:3.
182
SCM Agreement, supra note 91, art. 21.3.
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The use of unilateral tariffs to challenge green industrial policy is a
recent development but seems likely to become increasingly common. On
October 19, 2011, SolarWorld Industries America Inc., the American
subsidiary of a German solar panel manufacturer, filed a petition seeking
antidumping and countervailing duties against Chinese manufacturers of
solar panels. SolarWorld’s petition was supported by six other American
solar panel manufacturers who chose to remain anonymous (out of fear of
potential Chinese retaliation), adopting the collective moniker of the
Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing.183 The petition alleged that
eight types of Chinese subsidy programs for renewable energy caused or
threatened to cause material injury to U.S. manufacturers of solar cells.184
The petition accused the Chinese firms benefiting from these subsidies of
“dumping” their products into the United States at low prices. It asked the
U.S. government to impose punitive tariffs in the form of CVDs and
antidumping duties against the Chinese manufacturers.185
The U.S. International Trade Commission ruled preliminarily in the
petitioners’ favor186 and the Department of Commerce announced in March
2012 that it would enact preliminary CVD tariffs of 2.90% to 4.73%
against Chinese solar panel manufacturers.187 China greeted this news in a
restrained manner because of the low nominal figures of the tariffs.188
183

Keith Bradsher, Trade War in Solar Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at B1. For more
information about the Coalition of American Solar Manufacturers, see COALITION FOR AM. SOLAR
MANUFACTURING, http://www.americansolarmanufacturing.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
184
Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the
People’s Republic of China: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 76 Fed. Reg. 70,966,
70,966, 70,968–69 (Nov. 16, 2011). The eight types of subsidy programs noted in the petition were:
(a) “Grant Programs,” (b) “Government Provision of Goods and Services for Less Than Adequate
Remuneration (LTAR),” (c) “Government Provision of Land for LTAR,” (d) “Policy Lending to the
Renewable Energy Industry,” (e) “Income and Other Direct Tax Exemption and Reduction Programs,”
(f) “Indirect Tax and Tariff Exemption Programs,” (g) “Export Credit Subsidy Programs,” and
(h) “Export Guarantees and Insurance for Green Technology.” Under the category of grant programs,
six specific programs are listed in the petition, of which three are provided by subcentral government
entities. Under the category of income and other direct tax exemption and reduction programs, eleven
specific programs are listed in the petition, of which two are administered by subcentral government
entities and two are specific for certain localities. Id. at 70,968–69.
185
The petition also accused the Chinese manufacturers of “dumping” their products into the U.S.
market and asked the U.S. government to impose antidumping duties against Chinese solar cells as
well. See id. at 70,966.
186
See News Release, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, USITC Votes to Continue Case on Crystalline
Silicon Photovoltaic Cells and Modules from China (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.usitc.gov/
press_room/news_release/2011/er1202jj1.htm.
187
Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the
People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 77 Fed. Reg.
17,439, 17,456 (Mar. 26, 2012).
188
Keith Bradsher & Matthew L. Wald, A Measured Rebuttal to China, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
2012, at B1; see also Press Release, Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd., Suntech Response to
Preliminary Decision on CVD Tariffs in the Subsidy Investigation on PV Cells from China (Mar. 20,
2012), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/suntech-response-to-preliminary-
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However, two months later, the Department of Commerce announced that
it would impose an additional tariff, in the form of an antidumping duty of
about 31% to 250% against Chinese solar panel manufacturers.189 These
duties are among the largest ever levied against a product through a
unilateral tariff and will likely increase the cost of solar panels
significantly.190
China denounced the American action against its renewable energy
subsidies as a worrying indication of U.S. trade protectionism.191
Furthermore, China has sent clear signals that the United States’ actions are
leading both countries down a dangerous path toward a tit-for-tat green
trade war.192
Weeks after the U.S. industry petition was filed in October 2011, two
Chinese industry associations responded by filing their own petition asking
their government to impose trade remedies against U.S. renewable energy
producers.193 They noted that American producers benefited from an array
of subsidies, including the expansion of the renewable energy production
tax credit194 and investment tax credit schemes195 under the 2008–2009
decision-on-cvd-tariffs-in-the-subsidy-investigation-on-pv-cells-from-china-143531726.html
(discussing Chinese solar cell importer Suntech’s reaction to the preliminary decision).
189
Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the
People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value, Postponement
of Final Determination and Affirmative Preliminary Determination of Critical Circumstances, 77 Fed.
Reg. 31,309, 31,321–23 (May 25, 2012).
190
Keith Bradsher & Diane Cardwell, Chinese Solar Panels Face Big Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2012, at B1; Editorial, Obama’s Tariffs on China’s Solar Products Will Cost U.S., BLOOMBERG (May
15, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-15/obama-s-tariffs-on-china-s-solarproducts-will-cost-u-s-.html.
191
Press Release, Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, Head of MOFCOM Bureau
of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports Comments on U.S. Preliminary Ruling of Anti-Dumping and
Anti-Subsidy Investigation Against Imports of Solar Panels from China (Dec. 6, 2011), available at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201112/20111207864408.shtml.
192
Chinese Officials Warn of Protectionism in Solar Panel Sector, XINHUA (Nov. 12, 2011,
11:45 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/12/c_122271120.htm.
193
See China Chamber of Commerce for Imp. & Exp. of Mach. & Electronic Products & China
New Energy Chamber of Commerce, Petition for the Investigation of Trade Barriers Imposed by the
United States, Oct. 2011 (on file with authors) [hereinafter Chinese Industries’ CVD petition].
194
See id. at 36–37. The program offers a per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for electricity generated by a
wide range of eligible renewable energy sources. It was originally enacted as part of the Energy Policy
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1212, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2006 & Supp. IV
2010)), and has been extended on numerous occasions, including in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 1101, 1102, 123 Stat. 115, 319 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 45, 48), in February 2009. For more information, see U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Renewable Electricity
Production Tax Credit (PTC), DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY,
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US13F&re=1&ee=0 (last visited
Mar. 2, 2014).
195
See Chinese Industries’ CVD petition, supra note 193, at 29–30, 38–40. The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allowed “taxpayers eligible for the federal renewable
electricity production tax credit (PTC)” to receive either a grant from the U.S. Treasury Department or

438

108:401 (2014)

The Rise of Green Industrial Policy

stimulus acts, the Department of Energy’s loan guarantee program for
technology innovations for energy efficiency and renewable energies,196
and accelerated depreciation schemes for renewable energy investments.197
In addition, the petition also challenged the subsidy programs of nine U.S.
states.198 Chinese producers alleged that the various U.S. subsidy programs
harmed their ability to export to the United States and other foreign
markets.199
A week after the U.S. Department of Commerce levied its preliminary
antidumping ruling against Chinese solar panels, China’s Ministry of
Commerce responded with its own preliminary ruling against the subsidy
programs of five U.S. states.200 In July 2012, China launched its own
antidumping investigation into American and South Korean exports to
China of polysilicon, the main ingredient used in solar cells.201 This
investigation has resulted in preliminary tariffs as high as 57% for
American polysilicon and 48.7% for South Korean polysilicon.202 American
“the federal business energy investment tax credit (ITC)” in lieu of the PTC. It also allowed any
taxpayers eligible for the ITC to instead receive the grant from the U.S. Treasury Department for new
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198
The policies under challenge included grants, tax credits, tax rebates, tax exemptions, bonds,
loans, and loan guarantees. See Chinese Industries’ CVD petition, supra note 193, at 29–43.
199
See id. at 44–51.
200
Press Release, Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, Announcement No. 26 of
2012 of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China on the Preliminary Investigation
Conclusion on the U.S. Policy Support and Subsidies for Its Renewable Energy Sector (May 27, 2012),
available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/buwei/201206/20120608161120.shtml;
Areddy & Ma, supra note 4.
201
Leslie Hook, China Launches Anti-Dumping Probe Against US, FIN. TIMES (July 20, 2012,
12:07 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3623df3a-d254-11e1-abe7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2dwN6
FgbO.
202
Wayne Ma, China Aims Duties at the U.S., South Korea, WALL ST. J. (Asia ed.), July 19–21,
2013, at 17.

439

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

officials responded by saying that they would look closely into whether the
Chinese tariffs violate WTO rules.203
The Chinese actions are a clear signal that two can play this game.
Having fired the opening salvo against China, the United States can expect
its producers to be hit with similar retaliatory action in the Chinese market.
European producers were also placed on notice that they too may be hit
with retaliatory tariffs as their products have been subject to a Chinese
antidumping investigation since November 2012.204 If the EU did not back
down off its preliminary tariffs, China warned that it may follow with
sanctions against European polysilicon as well.205
This phenomenon of resorting to unilateral trade remedies cases rather
than multilateral WTO litigation is now spreading beyond the already
contentious Sino–American relationship. Already, South Korean solar
manufacturers have found themselves in the crosshairs of the Sino–
American trade row.206 Unilateral trade remedies cases have also spread to
Europe207 and India.208 The Indian dispute, in turn, has managed to ensnare
Malaysia and Taiwan into the growing solar panel trade wars.209
Following the success of its U.S. case, in July 2012, German
manufacturer SolarWorld spearheaded a coalition of European solar panel
companies to file an antidumping complaint with the European
Commission against Chinese solar panels.210 In September 2012, despite
strong diplomatic pressure from China to reject the petition, the EU
announced that it would launch an investigation.211 The antidumping case is
the largest ever, covering $20 billion worth of imports.212 Weeks later,
European companies filed another complaint with the European
Commission seeking countervailing duties against Chinese imports as
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redress for allegedly illegal Chinese government subsidies.213 China
responded with a warning that “the EU’s decision to check China’s solar
products via protectionist measures is short-sighted and the bloc would
become its own victim.”214
The investigation sparked considerable tension within the EU. In May
2013, the Commission recommended imposing provisional antidumping
duties, averaging 47% against Chinese solar panels.215 However, eighteen
EU members, including Germany, opposed the Commission’s
recommendation, leading the EU Trade Commissioner to agree to impose a
lower rate averaging 11.8% for two months, while attempting to negotiate a
settlement.216 In July 2013, the EU and China agreed that the Chinese
producers would limit their exports to a certain quota and sell above a
negotiated minimum price.217 So long as Chinese exporters complied with
the terms of the settlement agreement, the EU would refrain from imposing
tariffs. Those that refused, however, would be subject to the 47%
provisional duties.218
The United States and European trade rows with China also inspired
India’s solar panel manufacturers to seek action against its competitors. In
June 2012, the Indian Solar Manufacturer’s Association filed a petition
accusing American, Chinese, Malaysian, and Taiwanese producers of
dumping their products at “ridiculously low” prices into the Indian
market.219 An industry spokesperson described the foreign products’ prices
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as “artificial and not at all related to the cost of the product.”220 In late
November, the Indian government announced that it had accepted the
petition and begun an investigation into the allegations.221 In the near
future, a growing number of countries’ solar panel producers could find
themselves facing significantly higher tariffs in four major markets—the
United States, Europe, China, and India.
Nor are trade remedies cases restricted simply to solar panels. In
December 2012, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that it
would levy additional tariffs of up to 71% on Chinese wind turbines and up
to 58% on Vietnamese wind turbines, in response to an antidumping case
brought by four American companies.222 A Chinese industry spokesperson
denounced the quasi-protectionist move, describing the United States as
“trying to protect their own industry amid an economic downturn, without
considering the development of the whole industry chain.”223 The additional
tariffs are expected to cut into the profits of wind developers in the United
States and diminish demand for wind power.224
III. KEY IMPLICATIONS FROM THE RISE OF GREEN INDUSTRIAL
POLICY DISPUTES
Trade tensions between major countries are undoubtedly increasing on
account of green industrial policies. Five years ago, one might have
predicted that the next wave of trade and environment cases would be over
carbon taxes and “cap-and-trade” schemes; yet this has not proven to be the
case. A dispute over environmentally conditioned market access, such as
the European aviation ETS conflict, is now the exception rather than the
rule. Since 2009, the vast majority of disputes are Next Generation
conflicts, where industrial policies feature both environmental benefits and
significant protectionism. This shift has largely gone unnoticed, but it
presents major implications for conceptualizing the legal and political
economy dynamics of trade and environment conflicts in four key respects.
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A. The Rise of Multiple Fora: The WTO and Domestic
Administrative Courts
First, Next Generation disputes are being litigated not only at the
WTO but also in trade remedies proceedings before domestic
administrative agencies. While such proceedings are subject to oversight by
WTO rules, they have the advantage of allowing governments to take quick
unilateral action without waiting for costly and time-consuming
multilateral review.225
Nevertheless, the development of a second channel for trade dispute
litigation presents its own risks. Without a neutral multilateral body serving
as an impartial adjudicator, the outcome of these administrative
proceedings may be seen as politically motivated. Aggrieved parties will
put pressure on their own government to respond in kind. This gives rise to
an increased risk of a unilateral action sparking a tit-for-tat trade dispute.
The Sino–American and Sino–European trade rows over solar panels
provide a disturbing lens into how such disputes can evolve into a brewing
trade war.226
Furthermore, the options for postjudgment compliance differ
dramatically when a ruling stems from a WTO proceeding as opposed to a
domestic trade remedy proceeding. We will elaborate further on this
difference and the resulting implications in Part IV when we assess
potential options for legal reform. For now, it is sufficient to note that the
rise of green industrial policies has opened the door to trade and
environment disputes being subject to domestic administrative proceedings
in addition to WTO proceedings. This presents new risks for escalating
trade tensions.
B. “Good” Versus “Bad” Actors: It’s Become Much More Complicated
Second, the rise of Next Generation disputes has upended the Classic
stereotype of the developed country as the environmentally friendly actor
and the developing country as environmentally unfriendly. In many
instances, the roles are now reversed. Often, it is the developing country
that adopts the pro-environmental policy, and it is the developed country
that seeks to have the policy declared illegal under WTO law. Even in
instances where the country adopting the pro-environmental subsidy policy
is a developed country (e.g., Canada’s feed-in-tariff program), it is its
fellow developed countries that seek to have it terminated.227
To the extent that the defendant countries are viewed as “bad” actors,
it is not because of their unwillingness to tackle environmental problems,
but because of their demand for rents for their domestic industry in
225
226
227
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exchange for pro-environmental actions. Such demands may reduce
welfare overall and violate the spirit of international trade rules. Yet, even
here, the case against them is not altogether clear. Some sympathize with
the developing countries’ argument that they are being asked to bear a
disproportionate cost for environmental harms caused primarily by
developed countries.228 Developing countries have a pressing need to lift
their populations out of poverty, and developed countries have steadfastly
refused to make the standard-of-living sacrifices necessary to move toward
developing countries’ much lower per capita emissions rates. To some, this
quid pro quo demand may appear reasonable, especially when trade law
carves out exceptions to allow for other welfare-reducing rents that reflect
historical realities.229
Even with the export restrictions, China points out that it could simply
follow the developed countries’ lead of limiting production and exporting
the environmentally harmful processing steps to other countries.230 The fact
that it chooses to bear this cost internally, some Chinese argue, should
entitle it to tax others that “free ride” off the environmental harms that it
internalizes.231 In levying such a tax, is China behaving as a mercantilist
actor exploiting its natural resources for strategic gain? Or is China simply
taking a more holistic view of supply chain externalities and forcing
consumers to incur the cost of upstream environmental harms if they refuse
to provide compensating positive externalities downstream? Would overall
global welfare truly be better off, China asks, if it simply shut down
production over environmental concerns, as the United States and others
have done, thereby triggering a massive spike in input prices, instead of
trying to remedy perceived differences in externalities through tax and
quota policies? At the very least, these questions show that the situation is
far less black-and-white than the earlier Classic cases.
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C. The Changing Political Economy: A Shattering of Key Alliances
Not only has the role of states changed in these conflicts, but so too
has the domestic political economy of these states. The earlier Classic
disputes featured an unusual alliance in the U.S. of labor unions, domestic
producers, and environmental activists in developed countries.232 This was
hardly a natural partnership, but their interests aligned in favor of the policy
of limiting environmentally unfriendly imports. Environmental and animal
rights groups took the lead, using market access to put pressure on
otherwise reluctant foreign producers; labor unions saw it as a means to
protect domestic jobs; and domestic producers saw it as a way to level the
playing field from stringent domestic environmental regulations.233
Building on the strength of these alliances, the environmental lobby
was extremely active in asserting its interests. Following the Tuna/Dolphin
ruling against the U.S. import ban, environmental groups raised the alarm
at the eagerness of unelected, ad hoc adjudicators in Geneva to neuter
domestic environmental regulations.234 Environmental groups quickly
added trade law experts and lobbyists to their staff to lobby government
delegations and bureaucrats at the GATT/WTO headquarters in Geneva.235
They also mobilized public opinion through provocative articles and street
protests.236 Their campaigns made trade and environment a major issue,
forcing the WTO to be more conscious of striking a proper balance
between trade and environmental interests.
With the rise of Next Generation disputes, this alliance on trade
matters has been challenged. Labor unions have turned avowedly antienvironment as far as the green industrial policies of developing countries
are concerned. In September 2010, it was the United Steelworkers, not
domestic producers, who first petitioned the White House to take action
against Chinese stimulus spending for China’s renewable energy sectors.
“These subsidies,” the union argued, “are helping Chinese producers ramp
up production, seize market share, drive down prices, and put global
competitors out of business.”237 Although the White House demurred on the
overall request, the petition did result in the U.S. filing of the China-Wind
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Power Equipment case.238 Labor unions have also actively supported the
ongoing trade remedies cases against Chinese solar panel manufacturers.239
They view the imposition of unilateral tariffs as a means to stem the
outsourcing of manufacturing jobs in the renewable energy sector to China
and other countries.
Domestic industry producers have split their allegiances. In the recent
U.S. trade remedies case against China, industry divided into two rival
coalitions. The Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing (CASM),
composed of six solar panel manufacturers (who chose to remain
anonymous out of fear of potential Chinese retaliation), supported
unilateral tariffs.240 A rival group of 150 solar companies formed the
Coalition for Affordable Solar Energy (CASE) to lobby against tariffs.241
CASE argued that trade remedies would backfire, costing the United States
up to 60,000 jobs as solar adoption rates and installation jobs decreased.242
The industry divide represents, on the one hand, the split between upstream
producers and downstream users, and on the other hand, the split between
domestic producers that have already outsourced some production to China
versus those that are still attempting to keep manufacturing in the United
States. Domestic industry no longer speaks with a united voice.243 The most
interesting actors, however, have been the environmental groups. Their
actions in recent Next Generation disputes pose a stark contrast to their
loud activism in the earlier Classic disputes, suggesting a Sherlock Holmes
phrase—the dog that didn’t bark. The WTO ruling in China-Raw
Materials, declaring that China is not allowed to use export taxes for any
environmental purposes whatsoever, is of serious concern for those who
believe that China must be encouraged to raise its level of environmental
protection.244 So too are the unilateral trade remedies cases in the United
States. These rulings raise the price of solar panels and delay their
adoption. Yet, after actively crusading for a more pro-environmental
238
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agenda at the WTO throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, global
environmental groups have retreated into near silence. Not one
environmental group criticized these rulings.
Environmental groups’ lobbying of the WTO Secretariat has also
quieted in recent years, despite the uptick in disputes. In the three WTO
cases challenging Chinese green industrial policies, no environmental
group weighed in with a formal amicus brief or even an informal press
commentary about the environmental issues at stake. Nor is the silence
limited to disputes with China. Even in Canada’s feed-in-tariff program, a
case between developed countries, only three Canadian environmental
groups filed a joint amicus brief in favor of Canada’s program.245 All of the
major environmental groups have remained quiet.
Why didn’t the dog bark? Why has the environmental community,
particularly U.S. environmental and antiglobalization groups that took such
a leading role in denouncing the WTO’s Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle
decisions, been so quiet in the face of decisions with similarly practical
significance, if not more so?
Based on our interviews with several environmental NGO attorneys, a
number of factors appear to be at work. First, there is a capacity constraint
problem. Some environmental groups have scaled back on the staff and
resources focusing on trade and environment issues. Even for those with
staff, the Next Generation cases implicate new areas of substantive trade
law with which their staff lawyers may be unfamiliar. As David Hunter,
former Executive Director of the Center for International Environmental
Law (CIEL), explains:
Back in the 1990s, when this became a major issue, CIEL had four attorneys
on this. They have closed their Geneva office. They now have nobody
working full time on [trade and environment]. The globalization dispute has
settled out and people moved to other issues. The environmental community
no longer has as much capacity to engage in the details of trade and
environment disputes. Plus, trade law has moved forward and it is a technical
area. You can’t now just wade in and engage with people.246

Much of environmental groups’ silence is due to a strategic choice
about competing priorities. For many environmental groups, passage of
effective national and international climate change reduction measures sits
atop their wish list. For either of these to happen, there must be U.S.
congressional legislation. The failure of the Copenhagen negotiations was
due in part to Congress’s failure to pass the Waxman–Markey climate
bill—the United States could not offer any binding commitments in
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international negotiations.247 It is hard to get other countries to adopt a
treaty with targets and timetables if the world’s largest economy has
nothing on the table.
For a domestic bill to pass, labor’s support remains critical. In return,
this requires keeping quiet about Next Generation disputes that place
environmental and labor interests at loggerheads. It is telling that the White
House did not receive a single comment from environmental groups in
response to organized labor’s petition against China’s wind power subsidy
programs. From our interviews, there is no doubt that many in the
environmental community understood the climate change benefits from
China’s initiatives, but they did not want to risk alienating organized labor.
As David Hunter observed, “Given the constituency the environmental
groups are trying to get along with, there is no net positive in putting
resources into that issue.”248 Environmental Defense Fund’s trade expert,
Jennifer Haverkamp, agrees. “Environmentalists spent lots of effort to
create the BlueGreen alliance and develop momentum for climate
legislation. They are going to tread carefully when labor has put a lot of
effort into a trade challenge.”249 The same is true for the solar power
conflicts. Many environmental groups well understand the antienvironmental costs associated with CVDs and antidumping duties.
Nevertheless, they do not want to be seen as pro-China and against the
American “green collar” worker, lest they lose organized labor’s support
for any future climate change legislation.
Despite the clear environmental cost stemming from the WTO and
domestic trade remedies rulings, most environmental groups are choosing
to hold their fire, hopeful that the larger prize of climate legislation remains
within their grasp. This silence, however, is not without cost. Because
environmental groups have sidelined themselves, the decisions that
industrialized governments are making in the Next Generation disputes are
increasingly reflective of the interests of labor unions and domestic
producers that have not outsourced production overseas. To the extent that
there is opposition, it is coming from domestic producers with more
globalized supply chains and from downstream producers.250 Importantly,
and unlike the Classic trade and environment disputes, pressure is not
coming from the environmental interest groups, though they most certainly
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have a dog in this fight since the Next Generation cases will influence the
shape of green industrial policies going forward.
As a result of this silence, the environmental implications of the Next
Generation disputes no longer factor heavily into the political calculus of
how to proceed on WTO cases or domestic trade remedies litigation.
Domestic policymakers, when deciding trade remedies or WTO actions,
instead weigh primarily the interests of labor and different domestic
producers, without substantial regard for the environmental impact. The
lack of serious environmentalist pressure is a significant loss in the
international trade debate.
While less obvious, the silence of environmental groups is also
jeopardizing efforts to build alliances and constituencies in China, India,
and other developing countries. In many of these countries (China in
particular) the lack of a robust domestic NGO community means that
domestic interest groups rely on foreign activists to champion their cause.
Chinese and Indians argue, and not without cause, that they are being sent
distinctly mixed messages.251 Anyone who follows the climate change
debate well understands that as go India and China with greenhouse gases,
so goes the world. China is already the world’s largest emitter of
greenhouse gases,252 and India is on pace to rival the United States by
2030.253 As a result, even if policy changes result in massive greenhouse
gas reductions in the United States and EU over the next decade, these
would be for naught if India and China do not follow course. It is no
surprise that the environmental community has so vigorously called for
actions that will strengthen India and China’s reliance on renewable
sources of energy.254
One can well understand China and India’s frustration, then, when
policies that do exactly this are subject to international condemnation,
challenges at the WTO, and unilateral trade remedies. And when this
happens, the very environmental groups that have been calling on China
and India to increase their use of renewables refuse to condemn such
actions. Chinese and Indians are becoming skeptical about whether these
environmental groups are truly the global interest groups that they claim to
be, as willing to stick up for the environmental interests of developing
251

Interview with Advisor to Chinese Government (2011-G2), supra note 231; Interview with
Indian Government Official (2012-G2); Interview with Advisor to Indian Government (2012-G4).
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See, e.g., China Environmental News Alert, SWITCHBOARD (Oct. 30, 2013), http://switchboard.
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countries as those of industrialized ones. Instead, they increasingly view
these environmental groups as beholden to the special interests of the West,
and are therefore more skeptical of engaging with global environmental
groups to find common solutions.255
The export restriction cases on raw materials and rare earths present
environmental groups with a different challenge. On its face, the WTO
rulings in China-Raw Materials and China-Rare Earths appear to be just
the kind of action environmental and antiglobalization groups have
denounced in the past—international trade law striking down domestic
measures that protect the environment.256 Yet, no environmental group has
chosen to weigh in. Here, the problem facing environmental groups is not
the question of jeopardizing a political coalition for climate change
legislation but, rather, whether this is a battle worth fighting. China’s
environmental justifications for the export restrictions are plausible but not
compelling. They could well be bogus justifications for protectionist
policies. Environmental groups do not want to risk appearing as apologists
for Chinese policies that are very unpopular in the United States, EU, and
Japan and that indeed may threaten national security. Therefore, rather than
condemning the WTO rulings, they have simply remained quiet.
The basic point is that the rise of green industrial policy disputes has
dramatically changed the dynamics of the domestic politics on trade and
the environment. No longer is there a stable alliance of disparate interest
groups pushing governments in developed countries to take a more proenvironmental stance against the incursion of trade law, as there was in the
Classic cases. Instead, the interest groups themselves are split. The labor
unions remain vocal, but have switched to railing against proenvironmental policies in other countries, now that developing countries
are implementing them through industrial policy. Domestic producers
themselves are split, reflecting the different strategies that they have taken
with respect to managing global supply chains. And environmental groups,
whom one might expect to be resisting these anti-environmental
developments, are instead staying silent. As they stake their strategy on
maintaining key domestic alliances for potential future climate change
legislation, they risk losing the trust of natural allies in developing
countries.
255

One interviewee explained, “Western advocacy groups are very useful when we want to direct
international attention toward an environmental problem. But we do not trust them when it comes to
giving advice about what should be our government’s policies.” Interview with Indian Government
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D. The Loss of Balance
So far, we have suggested that the rise of Next Generation green
industrial policy disputes has altered both the international and domestic
political economy of trade and environment cases. A similarly dramatic
shift is also occurring in the WTO law being applied in these disputes with
respect to how adjudicators balance the competing trade and environmental
interests.
Recall from Part I that almost all of the earlier Classic disputes
involved alleged violations of GATT provisions. With varying success,
countries sought to justify their trade measures under the GATT Article XX
exceptions, which involve a two-step “balancing” mechanism between
trade and environmental interests. The mechanism requires adjudicators to
first consider whether the policy measure fulfills the substantive obligation
of being “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”257 or
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources . . . made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.”258 Provided this is met, adjudicators must next examine
whether the policy measure nevertheless “would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or “a disguised restriction on
international trade.”259 GATT Article XX effectively requires adjudicators
to weigh whether the positive environmental impact of a regulation
outweighs its potential negative trade impact. If so, the door is open for an
exception to a country’s GATT obligations.
While activists initially worried that this balancing tilted in favor of
trade interests, the Shrimp/Turtle ruling helped assuage these concerns by
confirming that pro-environmental policy measures with extraterritorial
effects could be implemented so long as this was done in a fair and
nondiscriminatory manner.260 With the Classic cases, there was a perception
of a relatively fair balancing test at work. As Jennifer Haverkamp, former
Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Environment and Natural
Resources and now International Climate Director at the Environmental
Defense Fund, observes, “environmentalists felt they had won the
transparency battles and the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body decision made
clear that trade was not the evil black box it had looked like in 1990.”261
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In most Next Generation disputes, by contrast, this balancing of trade
and environmental interests disappears. Instead, the applicable law
effectively acts as a strict liability standard, requiring adjudicators to find
that so long as there is a violation of a trade obligation, the environmental
policy is illegal. This is true regardless of the size of the environmental
impact or whether it is sufficiently large enough to offset the negative trade
impact. The disappearance of a balancing test means that in many of the
Next Generation disputes, trade interests will trump.
Why has this happened? The environmental defenses under GATT
Article XX are available to the defendant if the complaint involves
allegations of a breach of a GATT obligation.262 Unlike the Classic cases,
most of the Next Generation disputes are not about breaches of GATT
obligations. A large number of the Next Generation disputes concern the
legality of pro-environmental subsidies issued as part of an industrial
policy. This is true of Canadian, European, and Indian feed-in tariffs,
China’s wind and solar subsidies, and the renewable energy rebate
programs of U.S. states. The applicable treaty law governing such subsidies
is the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM
Agreement), not the GATT.263
Unlike the GATT or the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT),264 the SCM Agreement does not contain an implicit balancing test
within its treaty provisions. Instead, the SCM Agreement originally
addressed environmental issues through the provision of a “safe harbor”
exception in Article 8 of the SCM Agreement. Certain subsidies were
deemed “non-actionable,” meaning that no country could take action, either
unilaterally through trade remedies or multilaterally through WTO
litigation, against such subsidies.265 However, this environmental safe
harbor expired in 2000 and has not been renewed.266 The same is true of the
nonactionable category for research and development, under which
subsidies for basic research of renewable energy would have fallen.267
262

The AB has also held that the GATT Article XX exceptions are available in the context of an
accession protocol where explicit textual mention is made of the WTO agreements inclusive of the
GATT. See Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution
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Today, the SCM Agreement has no environmental exceptions. So long as
there is a violation of any SCM Agreement provision, the subsidy program
must be abandoned, no matter how great the environmental benefit.
Some scholars have suggested that the GATT Article XX exception
could be interpreted as applying to the SCM Agreement in limited
contexts.268 Rob Howse, for example, advocates having the WTO “simply
clarify through an interpretative understanding that the existing Article XX
applies to the SCM Agreement, given its status as a lex specialis of the
GATT.”269 GATT Article XX need not be incorporated into the SCM
Agreement directly; instead, the WTO could simply interpret the SCM
Agreement as permitting nondiscriminatory subsidies for legitimate public
purposes.270 To date, the WTO Appellate Body has appeared reluctant to
take such an approach. When it has turned to the jurisprudence of one
treaty to examine the meaning of another, it has done so in instances where
the legal terminology employed in both treaties is nearly identical (i.e.,
there is a clear “textual hook”).271 To date, no GATT exception has been
declared applicable to a non-GATT treaty on account of the latter being lex
specialis. Making such a move more difficult is the fact that the SCM
Agreement was not silent about exceptions, but addressed them through the
Article 8 provisions on nonactionable subsidies, which negotiators
explicitly chose not to renew.272 Under current jurisprudence, the SCM
Agreement does not provide leeway for a balancing test for environmental
interests. So long as there is a violation of a trade interest, because the proenvironmental subsidy falls into a prohibited category or demonstrates
“adverse” effects, it is illegal and must be abandoned.
The lack of a balancing mechanism also holds true in the domestic
trade remedies cases that feature prominently in the Next Generation
disputes. Countervailing duty cases fall under the SCM Agreement
268
269
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ROBERT HOWSE, CLIMATE MITIGATION SUBSIDIES AND THE WTO LEGAL FRAMEWORK 18

(2010).
270

Howse has suggested that this might be done through interpreting Article 2.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement as allowing for such. Id. at 21.
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12, 2009) (applying GATS Article XIV(a) jurisprudence on “public morals” to a GATT Article XX(a)
defense using identical language); Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R ¶¶ 7.362–7.369 (Sept. 2, 2011) (applying GATT Article XX(b)
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described above. Antidumping cases are governed by their own specialized
treaty, the WTO Agreement on Antidumping (ADA), which again does not
have an environmental exception.273 So long as the complaint can prevail
on the three prongs of dumping, injury, and causation, the government
authorities will unilaterally impose an antidumping duty.274 No offset is
permitted in the tariff rate for environmental reasons; hence, the recent U.S.
antidumping ruling against Chinese solar panels raised tariffs by as much
as 250%.275
To be clear, balancing does not disappear in every Next Generation
case. In instances where export quotas are challenged, GATT Article XI is
implicated and therefore the GATT Article XX defenses are available.276
However, China-Raw Materials clarified that even in some Next
Generation cases involving GATT provisions, the balancing mechanism
still may not be available because the GATT Article XX defense was
bargained away, either explicitly or implicitly, as part of accession
negotiations when China joined the WTO. The Appellate Body confirmed
this was the case in China’s Protocol of Accession with respect to export
taxes.277 Thus, while the Article XX balancing of interests is available for
other countries, it disappears for China’s use of export taxes. This issuespecific, country-specific approach to not applying the GATT Article XX
balancing test has huge implications, given China’s central role in global
environmental affairs.
Taken together, the scope for balancing trade versus environmental
interests has shrunk dramatically in Next Generation disputes. GATT
Article XX balancing remains relevant in a few instances (e.g., export
restrictions), but, even then, it is subject to caveats depending on the
defendant and the conditions of its WTO accession protocol. For the vast
majority of cases (i.e., those concerning subsidies or trade remedies), no
balancing of interests is authorized under the applicable law. So long as the
trade interests are violated, the policy is illegal. Trade interests simply win,
regardless of the size of the environmental benefit produced by the
measure.
IV. ARE LEGAL REFORMS NECESSARY?
If one cares about environmental protection, the rise of Next
Generation disputes paints a disturbing picture. While Part II provided the
optimistic news that countries, including China and India, are undertaking
273
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policies to address global environmental problems, Part III showed that
these efforts may well be stymied by three developments. First, developed
countries, which have traditionally been pro-environmental in their trade
policy, are actively opposed to many of China and India’s proenvironmental policy measures because of their industrial policy linkages.
China has responded by challenging the trade legality of American and
European renewable energy policies. Second, environmental groups, which
have traditionally championed environmental interests in these disputes,
have turned conspicuously silent and are unwilling to press for greater
accommodation of green industrial policy measures. The debate, in turn, is
dominated by labor unions and domestic producers, which have pivoted
from defending domestic pro-environmental trade regulations toward
opposing foreign green industrial policies. Third, the applicable law itself is
shifting away from accommodating environmental concerns, given that
neither the SCM Agreement governing subsidies nor the agreements
governing unilateral trade remedies require any balancing of environmental
versus trade interests.
As a result, and not surprisingly, the rulings in the Next Generation
disputes have been unfavorable to environmental interests. In China-Raw
Materials, the WTO ruled that China must eliminate the use of export
quotas and taxes on natural resources whose extraction and processing are
environmentally harmful.278 The ongoing China-Rare Earths case follows a
similar fact pattern, with a similar ruling from the WTO Panel (with the
appeal still pending as of this writing). Domestic trade remedies cases have
resulted in the U.S. Department of Commerce levying tariffs of 31%–250%
on Chinese solar panels, raising costs significantly for solar installation.279
The EU has followed the United States’ lead, and China may well respond
with trade remedies of its own against U.S. renewable energy products.
Meanwhile, Canada’s feed-in-tariff program has already been deemed
illegal by the WTO, and European and Indian programs are currently under
attack at the WTO.280
While individual cases have been in the news, the larger patterns
underlying this overall shift and their implications have largely escaped the
attention of commentators. Only a handful of academics and analysts have
commented on this phenomenon, with most arguing for comprehensive
reform of WTO treaties.281 We begin Part IV with a short overview of the
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main reform proposals that have been advocated. We then posit what is
likely to happen if, as is likely, the status quo continues. We argue that the
situation may not be as bleak as feared. Instead, the expected
environmental consequences will vary dramatically depending on the fora
in which trade litigation is pursued. While most attention has been focused
on the WTO, we suggest that domestic trade remedies cases pose a much
greater threat to environmental interests. This area has received scant
attention but, in fact, warrants the greatest need for reform. We therefore
conclude by offering suggestions for a series of narrowly tailored reforms
of trade remedies to better accommodate the environmental interests
implicated by Next Generation cases.
A. An Assessment of Existing Reform Proposals
In Part III.D, we briefly discussed one reform that some scholars have
advocated: interpreting the GATT Article XX exceptions as applicable to
non-GATT agreements, on account of the latter being lex specialis.282 Such
a move would most likely occur through a WTO Appellate Body decision.
Another approach would be for WTO members themselves to reform the
law through negotiations.
Before elaborating on such proposals, it should be noted, at the outset,
that not everyone agrees further legal reforms are necessary or even
warranted. The standard view of the multilateral trading system is that it
exists to facilitate the creation of “reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade.”283 This, in turn, raises living standards through welfare
gains from trade. At its core, the system depends on the principles of
reciprocity and nondiscrimination. When these principles are violated, even
in the name of environmental protection, the regime should crack down on
violators. Otherwise, protectionism in the name of the environment
becomes too easy and undermines the trading system.
For those who embrace this view, the disappearance of a balancing test
in many of the Next Generation disputes is not necessarily troubling.
Certain violations, such as subsidies with local-content requirements,
should be illegal per se because they always violate the core principles and
open the door to protectionism. This was the standard “free trader”
response to the first Tuna/Dolphin case back in the 1990s.284
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Those who advocate reform tend to focus on the trade regime’s
obligation to promote both standards of living and sustainable
development, though from two different perspectives. The first is a legalist
view that the (re-)creation of some form of an environmental exception is
necessary to correct market failures. Government regulators must be given
the scope to provide the proper incentives for remedying public externality
problems. This group has largely pushed for an environmental “safe
harbor” for certain subsidies. The tilt toward trade interests in Next
Generation cases is due, in part, to the absence of an environmental
exception in the SCM Agreement comparable to GATT Article XX. This
was not always the case. The SCM Agreement originally included an
exempt category of “non-actionable” (or “green light”) subsidies
containing certain environmental subsidies.285 However, this category
expired on January 1, 2000, and was not renewed.286 Over the past decade,
several scholars have championed for its reintroduction, with most favoring
a broadening of the scope of permissible environmental subsidies.287
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Despite a mandate coming out of the Doha Ministerial to entertain such
proposals,288 little headway has been made in the negotiations.
The second perspective is an instrumentalist view that what matters in
trade law are not legal exceptions or balancing tests but, rather, the actual
tariff lines and schedules for environmental goods. At the end of the day,
this group argues, trade law fosters environmental progress when it
facilitates the global flow of environmental goods at low tariff rates.289
Thus, this camp pushes for the reduction of tariff rates on environmental
goods through a sector-based agreement. How would this be
accomplished? The WTO permits the negotiation of stand-alone, sectorspecific treaties for which countries can opt in. An example often held up
as a model is the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which
lowered tariffs on a series of information technology goods (e.g.,
electronics and semiconductors).290 The idea is to negotiate a similar treaty
for environmental goods, i.e., a Clean Technology Agreement. The Doha
Ministerial Declaration explicitly called for such negotiations,291 and in
recent years the idea has gained renewed traction among academics.292
However, little headway has been made in such negotiations; countries
continue to disagree on the most basic question of what qualifies as an
environmental good.293
The “environmental safe harbor” approach and the “Clean Technology
Agreement” approach are not mutually exclusive. Both predate the Next
288
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Generation cases, but each is enjoying renewed interest in light of the
recent disputes. Yet, the rise of green industrial policy diminishes the
likelihood of success of either approach.
As emerging powers embrace green industrial policies, the odds that
all parties can agree on the scope of an exemption decreases. Developed
countries have become increasingly wary of a broadly worded
environmental safe harbor, fearing it would limit their ability to take action
against protectionist measures cloaked in green garb. Moreover, as labor
unions recognize the utility of unilateral trade remedies cases, they will
place increasing political pressure on governments not to circumscribe their
ability to bring CVD cases by agreeing to any form of a safe harbor.
Meanwhile, Chinese and Indian negotiators face the opposite pressure. If
they agree to too narrow of a safe harbor provision that does not cover
some of their own subsidies policies, they will face political criticism for
having given their trading partners a legal exception without having
secured one for their own policies. Within their polity, these policies are
viewed not as trade distortionary, but as necessary for ensuring their
country’s sustainable development.
In addition, the rise of green industrial policies also negatively impacts
the negotiation of a Clean Technology Agreement. Such policies have
increased the competitiveness of developing countries in “core” goods.294
As a result, industrialized countries have sought to expand the deal to
include “non-core” environmental goods,295 but most developing countries
are suspicious. They consider the industrialized countries’ proposal a
backdoor ploy to gain concessions for industrial goods rather than
motivated by any true environmental concern.296 Meanwhile, developing
countries continue to demand special treatment, technology transfer, and
financial assistance.297 Developed countries remain wary of such demands,
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For example, hybrid cars and energy-saving elevators are among the products listed in proposals
put forth by developed countries. For a summary list of the products advanced in such proposals, see
WTO Comm. on Trade & Env’t, Special Session, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Manuel A.J.
Teehankee, to the Trade Negotiations Committee for the Purpose of the TNC Stocktaking Exercise,
TN/TE/19 (Mar. 22, 2010).
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An Indian trade official asked why, if the broad list of environmentally preferable goods is truly
meant to be inclusive, do developed countries resist including on the list of noncore goods items such as
seed varieties that use less energy and are less carbon intensive, but which benefit primarily producers
in developing, rather than industrialized, countries? Interview with Indian Government Official (2012G1).
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See INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., LIBERALIZATION OF CLIMATE-FRIENDLY
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS: ISSUES FOR SMALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2009); Mahesh Sugathan,
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especially when they may be coupled with green industrial policies. In
addition, developed and developing countries continue to disagree over
how to implement tariff reductions. The odds of any agreement diminish as
the effects of green industrial policies take hold.
B. Do Environmental Interests Really Lose in Next Generation
WTO Cases?
If neither of the commonly espoused reform proposals is feasible, then
what are the practical implications? Just how costly is the failure to reform
WTO law to accommodate environmental measures in the Next Generation
cases? A WTO ruling against a green industrial policy triggers a welfare
gain, by requiring that a rent-seeking protectionist policy be eliminated.
But it may also trigger a welfare loss, by requiring concurrent abandonment
of a welfare-positive environmental policy. The importance of reform turns
on one’s assumptions about the size of the former versus the latter.
In this section, we argue that the expected welfare loss to the
environment from unfavorable WTO rulings is likely to be much lower
than feared. The explanation for this surprising result lies in the severable
nature of the challenged green industrial policies. In the Classic disputes,
the protectionist element is integral to the success and efficacy of the proenvironmental policy. Without the alleged discriminatory element—market
access restriction—the environmental policy loses much of its teeth. To
hold that the United States cannot ban shrimp imports on the basis of how
they are caught or that the EU cannot impose different taxes on flights on
the basis of their carbon emissions eliminates the very purpose of the
policy. While the Classic cases may permit the use of less-trade-restrictive
alternatives, the positive environmental impact is often seriously reduced
with the substitution of the alternative instrument.298 Ruling against the
protectionist element in Classic cases therefore deals a serious blow to the
pro-environmental interest.
This is much less likely in the Next Generation disputes. In most of
these disputes, the protectionist element of the policy is not integral to the
implementation of the pro-environmental policy. Canada, Greece, Italy, or
India could implement a feed-in-tariff regime without local-content
requirements, as Germany and others have done.299 Similarly, China or the
United States could restructure and scale back its solar subsidies to
WTO Negotiations on Environmental Goods: Ensuring a Meaningful Outcome for Developing
Countries, 1 INT’L TRADE F. 32 (2010), available at http://www.tradeforum.org/WTO-Negotiations-onEnvironmental-Goods-Ensuring-a-Meaningful-Outcome-for-Developing-Countries.
298
For example, the Classic cases have endorsed the use of labeling requirements as a permissible
alternative to an import ban. But the environmental impact of a label is much lower than that of an
outright ban. See James Salzman, Informing the Green Consumer: The Debate over the Use and Abuse
of Environmental Labels, J. INDUS. ECOLOGY, Apr. 1997, at 11.
299
See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
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minimize the adverse effect on foreign producers. And China could
implement a production quota or tax, rather than an export quota or tax, to
limit the environmental harm caused by extracting minerals. In other
words, in the Next Generation cases, one can preserve the environmental
benefits of a policy while discarding its protectionist harms.
A country whose green industrial policy is found to have violated
WTO rules has one of three options: First, it can sever the tradeproblematic, industrial policy element but continue with the rest of the proenvironmental policy. Second, it can try to find another way to retain both
the industrial policy objectives and the environmental objectives of its
policy by looking for another mechanism to implement its policy that is in
compliance with its trade obligations. This can be achieved by identifying
potential inconsistencies and/or loopholes in facets of WTO law. Granted,
this alternative may be less effective or politically difficult to implement,
which is why it was not pursued in the first place. However, it may provide
a second-best alternative. Third, it can drop the offending policy altogether,
with both the trade-problematic, industrial policy element and the
environmentally favorable element disappearing. Any of these three
options will bring the country in line with its WTO obligations. Trade law
does not require, or favor, any one of these options.300
Note that from the offending government’s standpoint, none of the
three compliance options was preferable to the trade-illegal policy. Each
results in higher fiscal costs and/or lower benefits for its domestic industrial
sectors. But with the threat of retaliatory sanctions now imminent,
governments must decide whether they are willing to bear the additional
cost of sacrificing another sector’s interests for the sake of maintaining
their green industrial policy.301 To date, most governments, given their
political economy constraints, are not willing to do so. Instead, they have
been forced to choose between the second-best alternatives in order to
avoid trade sanctions.
To illustrate, consider a case where the WTO declares Country A’s
pro-environmental local-content subsidy illegal. The sector enjoying the
subsidies will lobby against trimming them, but other sectors against whom
retaliatory sanctions are threatened will lobby for the government to bring
its subsidy policy into compliance to avoid being hurt. The government of
the losing country faces three basic options: First, it can sever and drop the
local-content requirement but continue providing the subsidy. This option
sacrifices the industrial policy objective, but preserves the environmental
300

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, supra note 156,
art. 19 (footnote omitted) (noting that the panel or Appellate Body “may” but is not required to “suggest
ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations” that “the Member
concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement”).
301
If the government does not drop the offending policy “within a reasonable period of time,”
WTO rules allow the complainant to suspend concessions. Id. art. 22.
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objective. Second, it can find a legal work-around solution. For example,
the country may have fewer obligations for government procurement than
subsidies; thus, it might shift away from using local-content subsidies
toward using tendering procedures to benefit domestic producers in nascent
renewable energy industries.302 This option requires Country A to maintain
its environmental objective without sacrificing its industrial policy. Third,
it can drop the offending policy altogether. Both the industrial policy and
environmental objectives are sacrificed.
Options for a WTO Member Following a Ruling
Declaring a Green Industrial Policy Measure Illegal
1)
2)

3)

Does the Environment
Still Benefit?

Sever the industrial policy element but retain the
overall environmental policy

Yes

Find a (second-best) alternative that retains both
the industrial policy and the environmental
objectives

Yes

Drop the entire policy, including both the
industrial policy and the environmental elements

No

If we consider these three potential scenarios, it is important to
recognize that only the third of these results in an environmentally negative
outcome. Under both the first and second scenarios, the environmental
benefits remain. The key question, then, is just how often will we see the
third scenario emerge?
We suggest that the answer turns on a small set of factors. The first is
whether a legal work-around solution exists. If not, then Option 2 is
foreclosed. If so, then two additional considerations are the relative
differences in cost and execution difficulty of the work-around solution.
Presumably, both are higher, but the relevant question is the marginal
difference of Option 2 as compared to Options 1 and/or 3. The second is
the extent that the industrial policy has already accomplished its objectives
or been judged an outright failure, in which case the policymakers may be
more willing to abandon it. The fiscal position of the government also
matters. Those facing tighter fiscal constraints would be more inclined to
jettison costly environmental programs without offsetting economic gains.
Finally, overall political economy considerations—the relative political
302

For example, South Africa requires that bidders for the Department of Energy’s Independent
Power Producer (IPP) Procurement Programme for Renewable Energy Projects adhere to certain localcontent requirements; this was set at 28.5% for the first set of tenders for solar photovoltaics and 47.5%
for the second set. See DELOITTE, THE MILLION JOBS QUESTION: LOCALISATION FOR RENEWABLES IN
AFRICA 9 (2012).
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strength and influence of the competing interest groups affected under each
scenario—will clearly factor into the policymakers’ decision calculus.
With these factors in mind, let us consider what has actually occurred
in the Next Generation disputes decided to date. In China-Wind Power
Equipment, China assumed the role of Country A, providing local-content
subsidies to wind turbine manufacturers. After the United States filed its
WTO case, China agreed to a settlement whereby it simply dropped the
local-content requirement (i.e., Option 1).303 The subsidies continue, only
now they take the form of a feed-in tariff and are available regardless of
whether the local-content requirement is met.304 Although trade interests
prevailed, the environmental benefits of large-scale wind power
manufacturing continued.
What motivated China’s actions? China’s decision was driven
primarily by the success of its industrial policy. Between 2006 and 2009,
China more than doubled its wind turbine installations each year.305 The
industrial policy, coupled with high demand, caused several foreign
manufacturers to relocate their production to China and strengthened
China’s domestic production capabilities.306 By 2010, China had overtaken
the United States to become the global leader in wind capacity.307 China
could afford to drop the local-content requirement, confident that its
domestic producers had become world-class leaders, thanks to its industrial
policy.
In China-Raw Materials, where the WTO declared China’s export
restrictions on raw materials to be illegal, China again faces three
options.308 The most obvious is to shift toward a production tax or quota.
This retains the environmental benefit, while eliminating the trade
distortion (Option 1). A second option is to remove the illegal tax and
quota and replace them instead with an export licensing scheme which is
permitted under WTO law. The licensing scheme, while not officially
303

Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 165.
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China
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Wind
Energy
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RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/
article/2009/09/china-launches-differentiated-wind-energy-tariffs.
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WORLD WIND ENERGY ASS’N, WORLD WIND ENERGY REPORT 2010, at 14 (2011).
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Doug L. Hoffman, Wind Turbine Industry Collapsing, Green Jobs Flee to China, RESILIENT
EARTH (Oct. 7, 2012, 4:18 PM), http://theresilientearth.com/?q=content/wind-turbine-industrycollapsing-green-jobs-flee-china; see also Tim Webb, Closure of Turbine Factory Takes the Wind out
of Britain’s Low-Carbon Sails, GUARDIAN, April 29, 2009, at 25 (describing closure of British plant
with jobs shifted to China and the U.S.).
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China World’s No. 1 in Installed Wind Power Capacity, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Jan. 14,
2011, 9:24 AM) http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90860/7260858.html. China is
expected to continue as the world’s leader for the remainder of the decade. Tildy Bayar, Despite
Slowdown, China to Hold Wind Power Market Leadership to 2020, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM
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limiting exports, would allow China to control the pace of exportation; it
therefore provides a legal work-around for China to maintain both its
industrial policy and environmental objectives (Option 2). A third option,
favored by foreign businesses, is to eliminate the export restrictions
altogether, without imposing any production restrictions (Option 3). But
this would result in the most environmental degradation because of the
higher volumes of mining.
Of these three options, China appears to be most closely considering
the second.309 This makes sense, because it allows China to best preserve its
full range of policy objectives. This industrial policy, unlike the wind
subsidies, was not designed to advantage and accelerate the growth of a
single industry, and was instead meant to benefit a range of Chinese
industries. So long as Chinese government guidance to a consolidated
industry does not rise to the level of a de facto export restriction, Option 2
appears to be a viable work-around. But even if it is not, Option 1
(production tax or quota alone) is still likely more attractive than Option 3
(no restrictions). It provides policy levers for the government to control the
strategic outflow of mineral resources and environmental degradation in a
way that Option 3 does not.
Do other countries behave differently than China? Our analysis
suggests they do not. Subsequent to the WTO ruling against Canada,
Ontario announced that it would amend its feed-in-tariff program to drop
the illegal local-content requirement (Option 1). Having already
accomplished its industrial policy objective of securing investments and
jobs, Ontario’s Energy Minister expressed confidence that Ontario’s clean
energy manufacturing sector would remain resilient, despite the policy
change.310 Again, like China-Wind Power Equipment, the WTO ruling
resulted in a victory for trade interests, but not at the expense of the
environment.
Meanwhile, India is monitoring the Canada-Renewable Energy case
closely because of similarities between its own program and Ontario’s. One
high-level Indian trade official remarked that, were the local-content
requirements of India’s program found illegal, it is highly unlikely that
India would abandon the program altogether.311 Instead, India would also
seek an alternative, WTO-compliant, work-around solution (Option 2).
Already, India’s lawyers are exploring such alternatives, even before a
WTO challenge has been filed against it. Potential replacement solutions,
309

China Cites Compliance with WTO Raw Materials Ruling, METAL BULL. (Jan. 31, 2013,
10:45 AM), http://www.metalbulletin.com/Article/3147874/China-cites-compliance-with-WTO-rawmaterials-ruling.html.
310
Ontario to Change Green Energy Law After WTO Ruling, GLOBE & MAIL (May 29, 2013,
4:23 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/
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in the event that the local-content requirement must be abandoned, include
using WTO-consistent investment requirements or government
procurement rules to continue fostering the development of the domestic
solar industry.
Finally, in the ongoing China-Rare Earths case, China also began
exploring an alternative, WTO-compliant, work-around solution (Option 2)
before a negative ruling was issued against it. The eventual work-around
solution will likely involve concentrating production in a handful of firms
that can informally advantage domestic downstream producers.312 Again,
even if a work-around solution proves untenable, China would likely still
prefer a production restriction (Option 1) that severs the industrial policy
component from the environmental component than an all-out
abandonment of any restrictions on rare earths (Option 3) that results in
greater environment harm.
In all of these cases, even if the defendant loses and the trade interests
prevail (as most of the defendants expect will be the case, given the current
state of the law), it is not at all clear that the WTO rulings will result in
negative environmental consequences. In no instance do we see any signs
that governments will abandon the pro-environmental policy altogether
(Option 3) as a result of losing their cases. Instead, because of flexibility in
other areas of WTO law, governments can find ways to implement the proenvironmental industrial policies through alternative channels. From the
government’s perspective, these work-around solutions may be second-best
policies, with higher political difficulty of implementation and/or less
effective results. But from an environmentalist’s perspective, the
environmental benefits are largely preserved, despite the original WTOviolating policy being abandoned.
The only instance where environmental interests clearly lose is Option
3, where the losing party in a WTO dispute abandons the policy altogether,
jettisoning both the protectionist industrial policy element as well as its
associated pro-environmental element. We suggest that this is most likely
to be the case when an alternative legal work-around is not available, the
policy itself is costly, governments face fiscal constraints, the industrial
policy to date has been unsuccessful, and the major beneficiaries of a tradecompliant policy would be foreign producers. While such a situation is
theoretically possible and may occasionally surface, our interviews with
trade and environment policymakers suggest that it will be infrequent. To
date, no government has taken such an approach in order to comply after
losing a WTO trade and environment case.
While counterintuitive, a ruling against a green industrial policy in a
Next Generation dispute is not likely to be environmentally harmful.
Because the environmental and protectionist measures are severable, Next
312
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Generation disputes are dramatically different than Classic cases. In a Next
Generation dispute, a country can comply with a WTO ruling by simply
eliminating the protectionist element of the policy or altering it to become
WTO compliant, while leaving the pro-environmental elements in place.
To date, governments have done just that. Thus, even though the existing
state of the WTO law governing the Next Generation disputes may be
unfavorable to environmental interests, the environmental harm from such
cases has been much less than commonly feared.
C. But Unilateral Trade Remedies Cases Can Be
Environmentally Harmful
Despite the surprisingly optimistic finding in the preceding section
that green industrial policies challenged at the WTO are unlikely to place
environmental benefits at risk, there is an important caveat to our analysis.
One of the key implications highlighted in Part III is that Next Generation
cases may be adjudicated in multiple fora. They need not take the exclusive
form of WTO litigation, but may also surface through unilateral trade
remedies proceedings. Five of the ongoing Next Generation disputes that
we have discussed so far—the U.S. petition against Chinese solar panels;
the EU petition against Chinese solar panels; the Chinese petition filed
against U.S. and Korean polysilicon; the Indian petition against U.S.,
Chinese, Malaysian, and Taiwanese solar panels; and the U.S. petition
against Chinese and Vietnamese wind turbines—fall squarely into this
category.
Trade remedies cases differ dramatically from multilateral WTO cases
in that they do not require that a losing party bring its policies into
compliance with WTO law. Instead, if the complainant prevails, the
government simply imposes higher tariffs unilaterally against the losing
party until it can be shown that the injury caused by the dumping and/or
subsidization no longer exists.
As a result, the options that a losing party has in a trade remedies case
are dramatically different. It can:
(1) accept the increased tariff and pay it, while passing on some, if not all,
of the cost to downstream consumers;
(2) stop exporting the product to the country imposing the unilateral tariffs
in order to avoid paying the increased tariff;
(3) try to raise the price of its products so that it is no longer found to be
“dumping” or injuring domestic competitors as a result of the subsidies
received;313 or
313

Note that in the instance of subsidies, theoretically, the losing party could also lobby the
government to eliminate the subsidies, but this does not happen as it would be against the party’s
interest. Article 19.4 of the SCM Agreement prevents the levying of a CVD “in excess of the amount of
the subsidy found,” so there is unlikely to be a scenario in which the cost of the CVD will exceed the
benefit of the subsidy for the party receiving the subsidy. See SCM Agreement, supra note 91, art. 19.4.
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(4) move production to a costlier location elsewhere to avoid the increased
tariff, while passing on some, if not all, of the increased cost to
downstream consumers.

Unlike the options available under the multilateral WTO dispute
settlement channel, all four of these options are environmentally harmful.
The first, third, and fourth options result in higher prices for environmental
goods. The second option results in decreased consumer choice for lower
priced environmental goods. All will result in slower consumer uptake of
renewable energy products, with the exact impact depending on the
consumer elasticity for the good.
One might think that the solution is to lower tariffs on environmental
goods, so as to offset the tariff increases associated with unilateral trade
remedies. Following the U.S. decision to impose unilateral antidumping
duties on Chinese solar panels, several individuals responded with a call to
reform WTO law by negotiating a Clean Technology Agreement.314 But
this misses the point. Adoption of a sector-based environmental goods
agreement has absolutely no bearing on the level of environmental harm
stemming from unilateral trade remedies.
To illustrate this point, suppose current U.S. tariffs on solar panels are
set at 10%. A new Clean Technology Agreement is reached and entirely
eliminates tariffs on solar panels. Without any unilateral trade remedies,
this decrease in tariff levels by 10% is environmentally favorable,
increasing access to and competition among environmental goods.
Following an antidumping or CVD ruling, however, the adjudicator
determines the absolute tariff level necessary to offset the injury from the
harm caused by the dumping or subsidization. Suppose that the adjudicator
determined that the tariff level required to remedy the injury was 250% (as
the U.S. Department of Commerce recently ruled regarding the Chinese
solar panels).315 Regardless of whether a Clean Technology Agreement is in
place or not, we arrive at the same outcome—a tariff of 250% on Chinese
solar panels. Thus, the existence of a Clean Technology Agreement only
alters the amount of the marginal increase (240% versus 250%); the
absolute tariff is the same under either scenario.
In most other instances outside of the environmental context, when
faced with increased tariffs due to trade remedies, the losing party has
moved production or simply paid the higher tariff and then passed on a
percentage (if not most) of the cost increase to consumers. Reports suggest
that this will also be the case with the Chinese solar panel manufacturers,
who to date have been the only losing party in such an environmental trade
dispute. This, in turn, will raise the cost of solar panel installations for
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American consumers and slow the rate of solar power adoption by
American households.316
Thus, the forum for Next Generation disputes matters significantly. If
the dispute is adjudicated through multilateral dispute settlement, then the
losing party has several options to comply with the WTO ruling. The two
most favored policy options to date also preserve the environmental
benefits of the illegal industrial policy. In contrast, if the dispute takes the
form of a trade remedies case to be adjudicated in domestic administrative
courts, then all of the options available to the losing party will result in
some form of harm to environmental interests—either through higher
prices or decreased consumer choice of low-cost environmental goods.
D. Pro-environmental Reform Proposals for Trade Remedies
If environmentalists are serious about potential harm from the rising
tide of Next Generation cases, then they need to focus on trade remedies
cases. We offer a series of four proposals below for consideration. As far as
we are aware, such proposals have not been brought forward nor have they
been discussed in the WTO Rules negotiations.
Before discussing our proposals, we note that one obvious solution
would be to require WTO members to agree to submit all disputes on
environmental goods through the multilateral WTO dispute settlement
mechanism. In essence, countries would agree on a temporary ceasefire on
the use of unilateral trade remedies against each other. In other areas of
international trade, WTO members have agreed to similar ceasefire
arrangements through implementation of a “peace clause” in the
agreements.317 Regardless of whether one is sympathetic to such an idea,
we think that it is politically unrealistic. The United States and several
other countries are determined to maintain the option of unilateral trade
remedies.318 Trade remedies offer a much faster, more direct, and more
politically popular means of response to unfair industrial policies compared
to WTO disputes. This is important to governments concerned that Chinese
316

Steven Cohen, Stop the Solar Trade War, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2011, 8:41 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-cohen/stop-the-solar-trade-war_b_1157573.html (“[G]etting into
a trade war with China will probably increase the price of solar power in the short term. This price rise
would take place at the worst possible time . . . . If your goal was to kill solar power in the United
States, this might be a good way to start.”); Martin Green, A Solar Trade War Could Put Us All in the
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(and potentially others’) policies are quickly eroding the competitiveness of
their domestic industries and determined to stop the outsourcing of
manufacturing of renewable energy products. If a formal “peace clause” or
an informal truce is not in the range of realistic possibilities, what are other
solutions?
The main cost of unilateral trade remedies from an environmental
standpoint is the fact that they result in higher costs for the environmental
good on which tariffs are imposed (e.g., solar panels), since a portion of the
cost of higher tariffs is passed directly to consumers. Our first proposal
seeks to address this cost directly. Governments, before imposing a trade
remedy, could be required to undertake an economic analysis of the effect
of the proposed tariff increase on prices. They would also estimate the
amount of additional tariff revenue that the trade remedy would bring in.
Based on this analysis, the government would designate a portion of the
additional tariff revenue into a fund that provides rebates to consumers of
the product on which a trade remedy has been imposed. Negotiators can
decide whether the precise proportion should be calculated as a percentage
of tariff revenue or of the expected price increase, and whether it is to be
given prospectively or retrospectively.
For example, suppose the American version of a solar panel cost 30%
more than a Chinese version. Suppose also that a U.S. trade remedy case
resulted in an additional 100% tariff imposed against Chinese imports.
Assuming the entire cost of the punitive tariff is passed on to consumers,
Chinese solar panels will now cost 54% more than American-made ones.319
This benefits American manufacturers. But environmental interests are hurt
by the trade remedy because the lowest priced alternative after the trade
remedy is imposed is now 30% more expensive. Assuming some price
elasticity in the demand curve, uptake of solar conversions is likely to slow.
However, our proposal would require U.S. authorities to give some
proportion of the increased tariff revenues from trade remedies back to
consumers who buy solar panels manufactured by any country’s
producer.320 Suppose after the economic analysis is performed, this rebate is
set at 15% of the purchase price. Regardless of what countries’ panels they
319

To illustrate this, assume the price of Chinese solar panels prior to the imposition of
antidumping duties is $100. The price of the corresponding American solar panel would then be $130.
Following the imposition of a 100% duty on Chinese panels, assuming the cost is passed on to
consumers, the price of a Chinese panel is now $200 (i.e., $100 + (100% × $100)). Provided the
American panel’s price remains the same, the Chinese panel is now 54% more expensive (i.e., ($200 –
$130) / $130).
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that duties collected from trade remedy measures cannot be redistributed to affected domestic
producers. See Appellate Body, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
WT/DS217/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003). The proposal therefore calls for the funds to be given to consumers
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purchase (American, Chinese, or other), consumers are now eligible for a
15% rebate. The environmental harm is mitigated, although not eliminated,
as the lowest price alternative is now only slightly more than 10% more
expensive than it was prior to the trade remedy. Assuming price is a major
factor driving consumer purchases, consumption should shift away from
Chinese imports toward American-made panels. The rebate, therefore,
would mitigate environmental fallout while benefitting primarily domestic
producers.
This proposal allows for two competing goals to be met. On the one
hand, as a result of the higher tariff, the foreign producer loses the cost
advantage that it had over the domestic producer due to its allegedly unfair
trade practice. If consumers continue to favor the foreign product, it is on
account of nonprice factors (e.g., quality, design) rather than price
advantages accruing from “dumping” or subsidization. On the other hand,
consumers are not forced to bear the brunt of the cost of the trade remedy.
A portion of the increased cost will be refunded directly to them, thanks to
the rebate scheme. Unfair trade practice concerns are accommodated, while
the negative environmental impact is mitigated.
Unlike other reform proposals, we do not anticipate that ours will face
serious political economy constraints. By raising demand, the rebate helps
both domestic producers and downstream suppliers, two groups that have
otherwise been at loggerheads in the trade remedies cases. In addition, both
labor and environmental groups could support such a proposal; the rebates
trigger more installation jobs and greater adoption of renewable
technology. Moreover, the proposal is self-financing; funding for the
rebates is based on projections of duties collected.
A second possibility is to limit the number of trade remedies that may
be applied to environmental goods simultaneously. For example, WTO
members might agree on a decision that sets the limit at no more than three
simultaneous trade remedy measures on environmental goods. This
preserves the flexibility of countries to take action against dumping or
unfair subsidization as they see fit. It also allows countries to retain the
option to take action in truly harmful situations, involving predatory
pricing.321 But it will prevent them from abusing this flexibility to enact a
large swath of trade remedies simply for the sake of protecting domestic
renewable energy industries by keeping prices of environmentally
beneficial foreign products artificially high.322 In addition, with a cap, a
government will need to carefully consider whether a particular case or
321
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product is important enough for it to use up one of its allotments, instead of
taking measures on close to every case filed by domestic producers.
Finally, the cap will induce the sunset of certain long-standing trade
remedies in order to make room for more recent ones.
Indeed, one of the dangers of trade remedies is that the high tariff rates
imposed from such cases are allowed to continue for long periods of time.
WTO law places no limits on how long antidumping duties and CVDs can
be maintained, so long as they are reviewed every five years and the
investigating authorities determine that injury would result from their
termination.323 The loose legal standard governing these sunset reviews
allows for governments to maintain trade remedies for long periods. For
example, the United States has antidumping duties dating back to the
Reagan Administration,324 and the EU has antidumping measures dating
back to 1990.325
A third and related idea is to place a strict time limit on how long trade
remedies may be maintained for environmental goods. For example, the
WTO Safeguards Agreement allows for safeguards to be maintained for
only three years before compensation must be paid.326 WTO members could
decide to place a similar time limit on the imposition of trade remedies
against environmental goods. This proposal recognizes the fact that in
imposing a tariff following a trade remedies case, a government wants to
grant its domestic industries sufficient time to recover from the effects of
their competitor’s “dumping” or subsidization. However, setting a time
limit ensures any environmental cost is limited to the near term.
A fourth and final proposal is to place an upper bound on the size of
the additional tariff that may be imposed in a trade remedies case. This is
likely to be controversial because it runs against the principle that
governments should always be allowed to impose trade remedies at a level
high enough to sufficiently remedy the injury caused by the “dumping” or
subsidization.327 This would prevent a sudden shock of the sort that is
expected when solar panel prices rise sharply in the United States following
the imposition of preliminary antidumping duties of up to 250%. Already,
experts are forecasting a major decrease in new solar installations in the
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United States as an expected casualty of these unilateral tariffs.328 If the
upper bound were set at 50%, for example, the impact of this shock would
be lessened for the environment, but the strong message to Chinese
manufacturers would still be clear.
Any or all of these proposals can be implemented unilaterally or
through a decision of the WTO itself, along the lines of the paragraph six
solution to the TRIPS Agreement.329 Thus, a formal amendment to the
WTO Agreement on Antidumping (ADA) or the SCM Agreement is not
necessary, although the amendment process does represent an alternate
means of implementation.
Given the practical impediments that make other reform proposals
difficult, why do we think that ours will fare any better? Every WTO
member faces the threat that another country may employ trade remedies
against its producers. Each recognizes that this behavior, left unchecked,
can lead to a degenerative tit-for-tat trade war in which all sides would be
hurt. Thus, each side benefits from proposals, such as those that we have
advanced, that place limits on behavior and therefore decrease the odds of a
trade war. However, none of the proposals require any WTO member to
disarm. Each still retains the option of employing a trade remedy, if
necessary, under certain circumstances. To use a nuclear weapons analogy,
the proposal simply places limits on the number and types of warheads that
each side may use, but does not ban them altogether. It is essentially an
“arms control” agreement for preventing an environmental trade war that
could infect other trade areas, too. The political cost of engaging in such an
agreement is much lower than one that requires giving up some policy
instrument permanently (such as tariffs in a Clean Technology Agreement
or litigation with the reintroduction of an environmental exception in the
SCM Agreement).330
What about the feasibility of the proposals from a domestic political
economy perspective? One might suppose that our proposals set up the
classic trade policy scenario of pitting competitive export-oriented sectors
against floundering domestic-oriented sectors. Certainly, this dynamic
holds true in those countries where domestic renewable sectors have fallen
behind and globally competitive exporters have yet to emerge in renewable
energy (e.g., India). But it is not the dominant model, at least not yet. In the
major trading powers (e.g., the United States, EU, China, Japan), the
traditional dynamic has yet to take hold. Instead, the affected domestic
industries harbor both offensive and defensive concerns—i.e., wanting their
328
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government to ensure continued market entry abroad while maintaining
flexibility to protect markets at home—and are enmeshed in complex
supply chains. Thus, the industry sectors that are affected are more likely to
be open to proposals that limit, but do not eliminate, the government’s
ability to impose trade remedies. The domestic political economy cost of
championing such proposals is likely to be much lower in this arena than it
would be in others, such as agricultural goods, where the domestic
divisions are more hardened.331 So long as the market dynamics remain
fairly fluid, a window of opportunity for our reforms persists.
If the environmental community is serious about trying to mitigate the
negative impacts from Next Generation cases, then their focus should be on
trade remedies. We have suggested four potential strategies to constrain the
WTO rules governing trade remedies to prevent such cases from triggering
a degenerative green trade war. Each has potential downsides, but
additional constraints would go a long way toward preventing Next
Generation trade remedies conflicts from undoing the progress made in
advancing renewable energy solutions to our environmental problems.
CONCLUSION
A fundamental shift is occurring in the nature of cross-border conflicts
implicating trade and environmental concerns. Yet, it is one that the public
at large appears to be missing. While many assume that China, India, and
other developing countries are dragging their feet on implementing
environmental policies, these countries, along with some developed
countries, are actually deploying traditional industrial policies to spark their
renewable energy sectors and capture these nascent markets. Although the
first-order motivation for these policies may be job creation and economic
development, they are nevertheless positive for the environment. However,
these policies have led to a series of trade conflicts because the instruments
deployed to execute the industrial policy often violate WTO rules. By
framing these recent conflicts within the conceptual category of Next
Generation cases and highlighting the contrast with the Classic trade and
environment cases, we have sought to shed light on the messier legal and
political dynamics of these emergent cases.
The Next Generation cases, at first glance, appear to trigger negative
environmental consequences. They have threatened the pro-environmental
coalition of the earlier Classic cases concerning endangered species and air
331
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quality. Labor unions lobby hard against foreign pro-environmental
industrial policies when they threaten to steal domestic jobs. Producer
interests have split. Meanwhile, environmental groups have stayed largely
silent. And the applicable law in many of these cases no longer even
considers environmental interests. This is as true of the subsidies-related
cases at the WTO as the trade remedies cases filed domestically. Under
such circumstances, so long as the policy violates the trade discipline, it is
deemed illegal, no matter how large or valid the competing environmental
concern. Although many of these cases are still ongoing, the ones that have
resulted in rulings so far have all been against the trade-problematic, but
pro-environmental, policies.
This broad shift in the dynamics of the trade and environment disputes
has escaped the attention of many. For the few that have noticed, however,
the shift has provoked alarm, leading to calls for legal reforms of WTO law
to help mitigate the environmental fallout from the rulings against these
pro-environmental policies. We have shown that this fear is overblown, at
least with respect to WTO cases. In green industrial policy cases, unlike the
earlier Classic cases, the environmental element is not at the core of the
policy deemed illegal. Our analysis suggests that governments, in
responding to these negative rulings, either find legal work-around
solutions or sever only the quasi-protectionist elements, keeping the
environmental benefits in place. Meanwhile, these rulings have welfarepositive effects in that they lessen the rent-seeking behavior embedded
within the industrial policy. Just because trade wins doesn’t mean that
environment loses.
At the same time, this trend is not true across the board. A very
different dynamic is at work in domestic trade remedies cases that lead to
the imposition of unilateral tariffs against environmental goods. Here,
environmental interests lose due to the higher cost and/or lower consumer
choice for environmental goods that result from such cases. As a result,
efforts to reform legal rules to mitigate the environmental damage from the
rise of green industrial policy disputes should focus on the narrow task of
reforming the WTO’s trade remedies rules.
In a world where climate change negotiations are faltering and a treaty
seems a distant hope, green industrial policy has emerged as one of the
most important areas for real progress. Litigation of this new class of trade
and environment disputes and the rules shaping the race toward a
renewable energy future have become an important part of the global
climate regime. How these rules are determined will play an important role
in charting the path toward a sustainable future.
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